mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

SteerCheck: Attribution Specificity and Alignment Leakage in Activation-Steering Audits

arXiv 2608.24335 ↗First posted 25 Aug 2026cs.CLcited by 1

On the map: Mechanistic interpretability → Activation steering methods

Abstract (arXiv)

Activation steering can change behaviour without establishing that the effect is specific to the intended concept. We introduce SteerCheck, a preregistered attribution audit that matches off-target KL and separates mean, protected-tail, polarity, transfer, and semantic claims. Exact replay of 960 Qwen3-14B interventions reveals complementary limits of common controls: isotropic directions occupy a narrow near-orthogonal region, whereas sign-randomized same-construction directions often retain substantial target alignment. Effect is strongly associated with signed cosine within the sign-randomized family (ρ=.94); 25.3% of its draws exceed cosine .5, and every draw exceeding the observed mean effect has cosine above .80. This alignment leakage does not by itself invalidate a conditional randomization test; it limits what the comparator can distinguish and motivates reporting exchangeability assumptions, a construction diagnostic A, and the empirical cosine distribution. The primary Qwen complete gate remains negative because the protected tail fails all families. On independent data, continuous margin transfers only in Qwen and accuracy transfers in no selected cell. Prospectively registered language controls pass the complete gate in Qwen and DeepSeek, while a passing DeepSeek detox comparator rules out categorical separation; all nominal passes are sensitive to Gamma=1.10. Frozen three-rater open-generation evaluation supports factual correction in DeepSeek but not Qwen; the automatic judge fails calibration (macro-F1 .562), so null-wide semantic results remain descriptive. SteerCheck makes these conditional and mixed conclusions auditable.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Activation steering methods, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability. Builds on 17 of its 28 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Aug 2026.

Builds on

17 of 28 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Where Steering Signals Come From: Activation Source Selection in Activation Steering28 Jul
  2. 2025Understanding (Un)Reliability of Steering Vectors in Language Models28 May
  3. 2024Towards Reliable Evaluation of Behavior Steering Interventions in LLMs22 Oct
  4. 2024Analyzing the Generalization and Reliability of Steering Vectors17 Jul
  5. 2023Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition9 Dec
  6. 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineering20 Aug
  7. 2022Extracting Latent Steering Vectors from Pretrained Language Models10 May

Other references · 10

  1. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,820
  2. 2024Qwen2.5 Technical Reportcited by 4,942
  3. 2025Gemma 3 Technical Reportcited by 1,824
  4. 2018FEVER: a large-scale dataset for Fact Extraction and VERificationcited by 1,375
  5. 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,336
  6. 2023Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Modelcited by 1,302
  7. 2024DeepSeek-V2: A Strong, Economical, and Efficient Mixture-of-Experts Language Modelcited by 1,135
  8. 2025Steering off Course: Reliability Challenges in Steering Language Modelscited by 34
  9. 2026Steering Safely or Off a Cliff? Rethinking Specificity and Robustness in Inference-Time Interventionscited by 6
  10. 2026Activation Steering for Aligned Open-ended Generation without Sacrificing Coherencecited by 4

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Activation Steering Induces Emergent Misalignment: A More Comprehensive Evaluation
  2. 2026When Attribution Patching Lies: Diagnosis and a Second-Order Correction
  3. 2026Building Comparative Motivation Profiles with Instrumental Interventions
  4. 2026Steered LLM Activations are Non-Surjective
  5. 2026When Is a Steerable Concept Representation Real? Measurement Confounds in a Cross-Family Audit of Neuroscience Parallels in LLMs
  6. 2026TAME: Token Attribution and Masking for Emergent misalignment
  7. 2026Forecasting Side Effects of Activation Steering
  8. 2026From Behavior to Provenance: Attributing Tabular Foundation Models to Synthetic Pretraining Data