Blind Refusal: Language Models Refuse to Help Users Evade Unjust, Absurd, and Illegitimate Rules
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Abstract (arXiv)
Safety-trained language models routinely refuse requests for help circumventing rules. But not all rules deserve compliance. When users ask for help evading rules imposed by an illegitimate authority, rules that are deeply unjust or absurd in their content or application, or rules that admit of justified exceptions, refusal is a failure of moral reasoning. We introduce empirical results documenting this pattern of refusal that we call blind refusal: the tendency of language models to refuse requests for help breaking rules without regard to whether the underlying rule is defensible. Our dataset comprises synthetic cases crossing 5 defeat families (reasons a rule can be broken) with 19 authority types, validated through three automated quality gates and human review. We collect responses from 18 model configurations across 7 families and classify them on two behavioral dimensions -- response type (helps, hard refusal, or deflection) and whether the model recognizes the reasons that undermine the rule's claim to compliance -- using a blinded GPT-5.4 LLM-as-judge evaluation. We find that models refuse 75.4% (N=14,650) of defeated-rule requests and do so even when the request poses no independent safety or dual-use concerns. We also find that models engage with the defeat condition in the majority of cases (57.5%) but decline to help regardless -- indicating that models' refusal behavior is decoupled from their capacity for normative reasoning about rule legitimacy.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 25 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Apr 2026.
Builds on
25 of 41 references.
References · 25
- 2022Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 3,634
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,330
- 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
- 2021A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignmentcited by 1,023
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learnedcited by 702
- 2021BBQ: A Hand-Built Bias Benchmark for Question Answeringcited by 683
- 2024LLM Evaluators Recognize and Favor Their Own Generationscited by 651
- 2023XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Modelscited by 477
- 2024WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMscited by 460
- 2020Artificial Intelligence, Values and Alignmentcited by 443
- 2023Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructionscited by 377
- 2024SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusalcited by 224
13 more
- 2024OR-Bench: An Over-Refusal Benchmark for Large Language Modelscited by 222
- 2024Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steeringcited by 191
- 2024The Art of Saying No: Contextual Noncompliance in Language Modelscited by 100
- 2022When to Make Exceptions: Exploring Language Models as Accounts of Human Moral Judgmentcited by 93
- 2025LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separatelycited by 75
- 2023SimpleSafetyTests: a Test Suite for Identifying Critical Safety Risks in Large Language Modelscited by 72
- 2025Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025cited by 58
- 2024Safetywashing: Do AI Safety Benchmarks Actually Measure Safety Progress?cited by 56
- 2025FalseReject: A Resource for Improving Contextual Safety and Mitigating Over-Refusals in LLMs via Structured Reasoningcited by 53
- 2024Navigating the OverKill in Large Language Modelscited by 40
- 2025CASE-Bench: Context-Aware SafEty Benchmark for Large Language Modelscited by 17
- 2024Cannot or Should Not? Automatic Analysis of Refusal Composition in IFT/RLHF Datasets and Refusal Behavior of Black-Box LLMscited by 11
- 2025Normative Conflicts and Shallow AI Alignmentcited by 4
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