mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

PlanTwin: Privacy-Preserving Planning Abstractions for Cloud-Assisted LLM Agents

arXiv 2603.18377 ↗First posted 19 Mar 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.ETcited by 3

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Cloud-hosted large language models (LLMs) have become the de facto planners in agentic systems, coordinating tools and guiding execution over local environments. In many deployments, however, the environment being planned over is private, containing source code, files, credentials, and metadata that cannot be exposed to the cloud. Existing solutions address adjacent concerns, such as execution isolation, access control, or confidential inference, but they do not control what cloud planners observe during planning: within the permitted scope, textitraw environment state is still exposed. We introduce PlanTwin, a privacy-preserving architecture for cloud-assisted planning without exposing raw local context. The key idea is to project the real environment into a textitplanning-oriented digital twin: a schema-constrained and de-identified abstract graph that preserves planning-relevant structure while removing reconstructable details. The cloud planner operates solely on this sanitized twin through a bounded capability interface, while a local gatekeeper enforces safety policies and cumulative disclosure budgets. We further formalize the privacy-utility trade-off as a capability granularity problem, define architectural privacy goals using (k,δ)-anonymity and ε-unlinkability, and mitigate compositional leakage through multi-turn disclosure control. We implement PlanTwin as middleware between local agents and cloud planners and evaluate it on 60 agentic tasks across ten domains with four cloud planners. PlanTwin achieves full sensitive-item non-disclosure (SND = 1.0) while maintaining planning quality close to full-context systems: three of four planners achieve PQS > 0.79, and the full pipeline incurs less than 2.2% utility loss.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 48 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Mar 2026.

Builds on

16 of 48 references.

Closest ancestors · 5

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic Coding Assistants: A Systematic Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Skills, Tools, and Protocol Ecosystems24 Jan
  2. 2026Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework17 Jan
  3. 2025MCP-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models with Real-World MCP Servers17 Dec
  4. 2025A Vision for Access Control in LLM-based Agent Systems13 Oct
  5. 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct

Other references · 11

  1. 2016Deep Learning with Differential Privacycited by 2,728
  2. 2026GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineeringcited by 587
  3. 2025Kimi K2: Open Agentic Intelligencecited by 567
  4. 2023Text Embeddings Reveal (Almost) As Much As Textcited by 192
  5. 2026SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agentscited by 130
  6. 2023Sentence Embedding Leaks More Information than You Expect: Generative Embedding Inversion Attack to Recover the Whole Sentencecited by 81
  7. 2024MAO: A Framework for Process Model Generation with Multi-Agent Orchestrationcited by 8
  8. 2024Is Your AI Truly Yours? Leveraging Blockchain for Copyrights, Provenance, and Lineagecited by 4
  9. 2025SoK: Semantic Privacy in Large Language Modelscited by 3
  10. 2025Distilled Large Language Model in Confidential Computing Environment for System-on-Chip Designcited by 2
  11. 2026Why Neural Structural Obfuscation Can't Kill White-Box Watermarks for Good!cited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.

3 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026PAAC: Privacy-Aware Agentic Device-Cloud Collaboration
  2. 2026Information-Theoretic Privacy Control for Sequential Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  3. 2026SPA: Securing Persistent LLM Agents Across Queries with Plan-First Information-Flow Control
  4. 2026SplitAgent: A Privacy-Preserving Distributed Architecture for Enterprise-Cloud Agent Collaboration
  5. 2025Privacy in Action: Towards Realistic Privacy Mitigation and Evaluation for LLM-Powered Agents
  6. 2026OCELOT: Inference-Leakage Budgets for Privacy-Preserving LLM Agents
  7. 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
  8. 2026AgentFlow: A Flow-Centric Policy Language and Framework for Securing LLM Agent Systems