AgentRaft: Automated Detection of Data Over-Exposure in LLM Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
The rapid integration of Large Language Model (LLM) agents into autonomous task execution has introduced significant privacy concerns within cross-tool data flows. In this paper, we systematically investigate and define a novel risk termed Data Over-Exposure (DOE) in LLM Agent, where an Agent inadvertently transmits sensitive data beyond the scope of user intent and functional necessity. We identify that DOE is primarily driven by the broad data paradigms in tool design and the coarse-grained data processing inherent in LLMs. In this paper, we present AgentRaft, the first automated framework for detecting DOE risks in LLM agents. AgentRaft combines program analysis with semantic reasoning through three synergistic modules: (1) it constructs a Cross-Tool Function Call Graph (FCG) to model the interaction landscape of heterogeneous tools; (2) it traverses the FCG to synthesize high-quality testing user prompts that act as deterministic triggers for deep-layer tool execution; and (3) it performs runtime taint tracking and employs a multi-LLM voting committee grounded in global privacy regulations (e.g., GDPR, CCPA, PIPL) to accurately identify privacy violations. We evaluate AgentRaft on a testing environment of 6,675 real-world agent tools. Our findings reveal that DOE is indeed a systemic risk, prevalent in 57.07% of potential tool interaction paths. AgentRaft achieves a high detection accuracy and effectiveness, outperforming baselines by 87.24%. Furthermore, AgentRaft reaches near-total DOE coverage (99%) within only 150 prompts while reducing per-chain verification costs by 88.6%. Our work provides a practical foundation for building auditable and privacy-compliant LLM agent systems.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 51 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 8 Mar 2026.
Builds on
16 of 51 references.
Closest ancestors · 7
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Privacy in Action: Towards Realistic Privacy Mitigation and Evaluation for LLM-Powered Agents22 Sep
- 20251-2-3 Check: Enhancing Contextual Privacy in LLM via Multi-Agent Reasoning11 Aug
- 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
- 2024From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection13 Dec
- 2024Navigating the Risks: A Survey of Security, Privacy, and Ethics Threats in LLM-Based Agents14 Nov
- 2024The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies28 Jul
- 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities11 Apr
Other references · 9
- 2016Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Modelscited by 2,221
- 2023Can LLMs Keep a Secret? Testing Privacy Implications of Language Models via Contextual Integrity Theorycited by 218
- 2024A New Era in LLM Security: Exploring Security Concerns in Real-World LLM-based Systemscited by 74
- 2024Security Attacks on LLM-based Code Completion Toolscited by 15
- 2025VortexPIA: Indirect Prompt Injection Attack against LLMs for Efficient Extraction of User Privacycited by 5
- 2025When Models Can't Follow: Testing Instruction Adherence Across 256 LLMscited by 5
- 2025Natural Language Processing of Privacy Policies: A Surveycited by 3
- 2022Understanding the Implementation of Technical Measures in the Process of Data Privacy Compliance: A Qualitative Studycited by 1
- 2023Static Analysis for Android GDPR Compliance Assurancecited by 1
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 6.
6 papers.
- 2026When Agents Do Not Stop: Uncovering Infinite Agentic Loops in LLM Agentscited by 6
- 2026Beyond OAuth: Task-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents via Natural Language Slicescited by 4
- 2026SkillScope: Toward Fine-Grained Least-Privilege Enforcement for Agent Skillscited by 4
- 2026PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Saycited by 4
- 2026Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026StealthBench: Measuring Operational Stealth in Autonomous Offensive-Security Agentscited by 0
- 2026StealthBench: Measuring Operational Stealth in Autonomous Offensive-Security Agents28 Jul 2026
- 2026When Agents Do Not Stop: Uncovering Infinite Agentic Loops in LLM Agents2 Jul 2026
- 2026Agents That Know Too Much: A Data-Centric Survey of Privacy in LLM Agents25 Jun 2026
- 2026PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say29 May 2026
- 2026SkillScope: Toward Fine-Grained Least-Privilege Enforcement for Agent Skills7 May 2026
- 2026Beyond OAuth: Task-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents via Natural Language Slices17 Mar 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026An Evaluation of Data Leakage Risks in Tool-Using LLM Agents in Realistic Scenarios
- 2025Exposing LLM User Privacy via Traffic Fingerprint Analysis: A Study of Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Interactions
- 2026ASLEval: Measuring Privacy Exposure Displacement in LLM Agent Sessions
- 2026OverAct: Measuring and Mitigating Proactive Over-Authorization in LLM Tool-Calling Agents
- 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety
- 2024Whispers in the Machine: Confidentiality in Agentic Systems
- 2025ToolTweak: An Attack on Tool Selection in LLM-based Agents