GT-HarmBench: Benchmarking AI Safety Risks Through the Lens of Game Theory
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Abstract (arXiv)
Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable and deployed in high-stakes multi-agent environments. However, existing AI safety benchmarks largely evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict poorly understood. We introduce GT-HarmBench, a benchmark of 1,535 high-stakes scenarios spanning game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Scenarios are drawn from realistic AI risk contexts in the MIT AI Risk Repository. Across 15 frontier models, agents fail to choose socially beneficial actions in 38% of high-stakes cases, such as military escalation, election manipulation, and medical malpractice. We measure sensitivity to game-theoretic prompt framing and ordering, and analyze reasoning patterns driving failures. We further show that game-theoretic interventions improve socially beneficial outcomes by up to 18%. Our results highlight substantial reliability gaps and provide a broad standardized testbed for studying alignment in multi-agent environments. The benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/gt-harmbench.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 5 of its 53 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Feb 2026.
Builds on
5 of 53 references.
References · 5
- 2024Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agentscited by 125
- 2024GTBench: Uncovering the Strategic Reasoning Limitations of LLMs via Game-Theoretic Evaluationscited by 120
- 2023Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Evaluating Strategic Planning and Execution of LLM Agents in an Auction Arenacited by 78
- 2025From Natural Language to Extensive-Form Game Representationscited by 6
- 2025Can LLMs effectively provide game-theoretic-based scenarios for cybersecurity?cited by 4
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 5.
5 papers.
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- 2026WARBENCH: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Evaluating LLMs in Military Decision-Makingcited by 1
- 2026Strategic Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Architecture for Cost-Effective Code Vulnerability Detectioncited by 0
- 2026When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Gamescited by 0
- 2026When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games6 Jul 2026
- 2026Strategic Heterogeneous Multi-Agent Architecture for Cost-Effective Code Vulnerability Detection23 Apr 2026
- 2026CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas16 Apr 2026
- 2026Evaluating Cooperation in LLM Social Groups through Elected Leadership13 Apr 2026
- 2026WARBENCH: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Evaluating LLMs in Military Decision-Making22 Mar 2026