Stress-Testing Alignment Audits With Prompt-Level Strategic Deception
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security
Abstract (arXiv)
Alignment audits aim to robustly identify hidden goals from strategic, situationally aware misaligned models. Despite this threat model, existing auditing methods have not been systematically stress-tested against deception strategies. We address this gap, implementing an automatic red-team pipeline that generates deception strategies (in the form of system prompts) tailored to specific white-box and black-box auditing methods. Stress-testing assistant prefills, user persona sampling, sparse autoencoders, and token embedding similarity methods against secret-keeping model organisms, our automatic red-team pipeline finds prompts that deceive both the black-box and white-box methods into confident, incorrect guesses. Our results provide the first documented evidence of activation-based strategic deception, and suggest that current black-box and white-box methods would not be robust to a sufficiently capable misaligned model.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 31 of its 54 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2026.
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31 of 54 references.
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