mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Monotonicity as an Architectural Bias for Robust Language Models

arXiv 2602.02686 ↗First posted 2 Feb 2026cs.CL cs.AI cs.CRcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails

Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models (LLMs) are known to exhibit brittle behavior under adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks, even after extensive alignment and fine-tuning. This fragility reflects a broader challenge of modern neural language models: small, carefully structured perturbations in high-dimensional input spaces can induce large and unpredictable changes in internal semantic representations and output. We investigate monotonicity as an architectural inductive bias for improving the robustness of Transformer-based language models. Monotonicity constrains semantic transformations so that strengthening information, evidence, or constraints cannot lead to regressions in the corresponding internal representations. Such order-preserving behavior has long been exploited in control and safety-critical systems to simplify reasoning and improve robustness, but has traditionally been viewed as incompatible with the expressivity required by neural language models. We show that this trade-off is not inherent. By enforcing monotonicity selectively in the feed-forward sublayers of sequence-to-sequence Transformers -- while leaving attention mechanisms unconstrained -- we obtain monotone language models that preserve the performance of their pretrained counterparts. This architectural separation allows negation, contradiction, and contextual interactions to be introduced explicitly through attention, while ensuring that subsequent semantic refinement is order-preserving. Empirically, monotonicity substantially improves robustness: adversarial attack success rates drop from approximately 69% to 19%, while standard summarization performance degrades only marginally.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 13 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Feb 2026.

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13 of 31 references.

References · 13

  1. 2019Exploring the Limits of Transfer Learning with a Unified Text-to-Text Transformercited by 14,491
  2. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  3. 2017OptNet: Differentiable Optimization as a Layer in Neural Networkscited by 588
  4. 2021Adversarial GLUE: A Multi-Task Benchmark for Robustness Evaluation of Language Modelscited by 227
  5. 2023Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLMcited by 173
  6. 2017Deep Lattice Networks and Partial Monotonic Functionscited by 62
  7. 2025Security Concerns for Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 26
  8. 2024Mission Impossible: A Statistical Perspective on Jailbreaking LLMscited by 21
  9. 2025Training Transformers with Enforced Lipschitz Constantscited by 18
  10. 2025Advancing Constrained Monotonic Neural Networks: Achieving Universal Approximation Beyond Bounded Activationscited by 7
  11. 2025Adversarial Suffix Filtering: a Defense Pipeline for LLMscited by 5
  12. 2025Understanding Knowledge Transferability for Transfer Learning: A Surveycited by 4
1 more
  1. 2016Stability Analysis of Monotone Systems via Max-separable Lyapunov Functionscited by 1

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