Hair-Trigger Alignment: Black-Box Evaluation Cannot Guarantee Post-Update Alignment
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Models (LLMs) are rarely static and are frequently updated in practice. A growing body of alignment research has shown that models initially deemed ``aligned'' can exhibit misaligned behavior after fine-tuning. These works typically assume that the initial model is aligned based on static black-box evaluation, i.e., the absence of undesired responses to a fixed set of queries. However, the limits of black-box evaluation for post-update scenarios is not explored sufficiently. In this work, we formalize model alignment in both the static and post-update settings and uncover a fundamental limitation of black-box evaluation. We theoretically show that, due to overparameterization, static alignment provides no guarantee of post-update alignment for any update dataset. Moreover, we prove that static black-box probing cannot distinguish a model that is genuinely post-update robust from one that conceals an arbitrary amount of adversarial behavior which can be activated by even a single benign gradient update. We further validate these findings empirically in LLMs across three core alignment domains: privacy, jailbreak safety, and behavioral honesty. We demonstrate the existence of LLMs that pass all standard black-box alignment tests, yet become severely misaligned after a single benign update. Finally, we show that the capacity to hide such latent adversarial behavior increases with model scale, confirming our theoretical prediction that post-update misalignment grows with the number of parameters. Together, our results highlight the inadequacy of static evaluation protocols and emphasize the urgent need for post-update--robust alignment evaluation. Code can be found at: https://github.com/Ybakman/safety_benign_update.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 32 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Jan 2026.
Builds on
32 of 45 references.
References · 32
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20 more
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- 2025From Dormant to Deleted: Tamper-Resistant Unlearning Through Weight-Space Regularizationcited by 12
- 2025Attack via Overfitting: 10-shot Benign Fine-tuning to Jailbreak LLMscited by 10
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- 2025Watch your steps: Dormant Adversarial Behaviors that Activate upon LLM Finetuningcited by 4
- 2026Adversarial Contrastive Learning for LLM Quantization Attackscited by 4
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