Defensive M2S: Training Guardrail Models on Compressed Multi-turn Conversations
On the map: LLM safety and security → Jailbreaking
Abstract (arXiv)
Guardrail models are essential for ensuring the safety of Large Language Model (LLM) deployments, but processing full multi-turn conversation histories incurs significant computational cost. We propose Defensive M2S, a training paradigm that fine-tunes guardrail models on Multi-turn to Single-turn (M2S) compressed conversations rather than complete dialogue histories. We provide a formal complexity analysis showing that M2S reduces training cost from O(n2) to O(n) for n-turn conversations. Empirically, on our training dataset (779 samples, avg. 10.6 turns), M2S requires only 169K tokens compared to 15.7M tokens for the multi-turn baseline -- a 93× reduction. We evaluate Defensive M2S across three guardrail model families (LlamaGuard, Nemotron, Qwen3Guard) and three compression templates (hyphenize, numberize, pythonize) on SafeDialBench, a comprehensive multi-turn jailbreak benchmark. Our best configuration, Qwen3Guard with hyphenize compression, achieves 93.8% attack detection recall while reducing inference tokens by 94.6% (from 3,231 to 173 tokens per conversation). This represents a 38.9 percentage point improvement over the baseline while dramatically reducing both training and inference costs. Our findings demonstrate that M2S compression can serve as an effective efficiency technique for guardrail deployment, enabling scalable safety screening of long multi-turn conversations.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 19 of its 32 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 1 Jan 2026.
Builds on
19 of 32 references.
Closest ancestors · 5
Same direction, newest first
- 2025SafeDialBench: A Fine-Grained Safety Evaluation Benchmark for Large Language Models in Multi-Turn Dialogues with Diverse Jailbreak Attacks16 Feb
- 2024Emerging Vulnerabilities in Frontier Models: Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks29 Aug
- 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack2 Apr
- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically4 Dec
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries12 Oct
Other references · 14
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- 2024WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMscited by 460
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