How Semantically Stable Are LLM Refusals? Measuring Confusion in Local Safety Boundaries
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
As safety alignment becomes standard in large language models, refusal behavior has become an important part of model reliability. However, models may still reject benign prompts, especially when the wording resembles risky content. Existing evaluations usually report global scores, such as false rejection rate or compliance rate. These scores are useful, but they treat each prompt independently. As a result, they miss local inconsistency, where a model accepts one phrasing of an intent but rejects a close paraphrase. This makes it difficult to understand whether refusals are only frequent or also semantically unstable. We address this gap by introducing Semantic Confusion, a failure mode that captures contradictory refusal decisions across meaning-preserving paraphrases. We build ParaGuard, a 10k-prompt corpus of controlled paraphrase clusters that keep intent fixed while varying surface form. We also propose three model-agnostic token-level metrics: Confusion Index, Confusion Rate, and Confusion Depth. These metrics compare each rejected prompt with its nearest accepted neighbors using token embeddings, next-token probabilities, and perplexity signals. Experiments across diverse model families show that global false rejection rate can hide important structure in the refusal boundary. Our metrics reveal cases where confusion is spread broadly, cases where it appears only in specific semantic regions, and cases where stricter refusal does not lead to more local inconsistency. These findings show that refusal evaluation should measure not only how often a model refuses, but also how consistently it refuses across nearby paraphrases. This gives developers a practical signal for reducing false refusals while preserving safety.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 32 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Nov 2025.
Builds on
32 of 34 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2025FalseReject: A Resource for Improving Contextual Safety and Mitigating Over-Refusals in LLMs via Structured Reasoning12 May
- 2024Automatic Pseudo-Harmful Prompt Generation for Evaluating False Refusals in Large Language Models1 Sep
- 2024OR-Bench: An Over-Refusal Benchmark for Large Language Models31 May
- 2023Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models with Only Few In-Context Demonstrations10 Oct
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned23 Aug
Other references · 26
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- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
- 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
- 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Modelscited by 983
- 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 960
- 2024How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMscited by 533
- 2023Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Studycited by 478
- 2023XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Modelscited by 477
- 2024WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMscited by 460
14 more
- 2024Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attackscited by 450
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 434
- 2023Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructionscited by 377
- 2023How is ChatGPT's behavior changing over time?cited by 265
- 2024ShieldGemma: Generative AI Content Moderation Based on Gemmacited by 224
- 2023Open Sesame! Universal Black Box Jailbreaking of Large Language Modelscited by 128
- 2024Curiosity-driven Red-teaming for Large Language Modelscited by 83
- 2024Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslationcited by 65
- 2024Navigating the OverKill in Large Language Modelscited by 40
- 2024Towards Safety and Helpfulness Balanced Responses via Controllable Large Language Modelscited by 14
- 2025You Can't Eat Your Cake and Have It Too: The Performance Degradation of LLMs with Jailbreak Defensecited by 9
- 2025Alignment Quality Index (AQI) : Beyond Refusals: AQI as an Intrinsic Alignment Diagnostic via Latent Geometry, Cluster Divergence, and Layer wise Pooled Representationscited by 7
- 2025Can LLMs Refuse Questions They Do Not Know? Measuring Knowledge-Aware Refusal in Factual Taskscited by 5
- 2025Evaluating LLM Agent Adherence to Hierarchical Safety Principles: A Lightweight Benchmark for Probing Foundational Controllability Componentscited by 2
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 1.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026LLMs Can Unlearn Refusal with Only 1,000 Benign Samples
- 2025The Instability of Safety: How Random Seeds and Temperature Expose Inconsistent LLM Refusal Behavior
- 2026Refuse without Refusal: A Structural Analysis of Safety-Tuning Responses for Reducing False Refusals in Language Models
- 2026Discern Truth from Falsehood: Reducing Over-Refusal via Contrastive Refinement
- 2025Refusal Direction is Universal Across Safety-Aligned Languages
- 2026Latent-space Attacks for Refusal Evasion in Language Models
- 2024SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusal
- 2025RefusalBench: Generative Evaluation of Selective Refusal in Grounded Language Models