Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problem
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Abstract (arXiv)
This paper bridges two perspectives: it studies the multi-secretary problem through the fairness lens of social choice, and examines multi-winner elections from the viewpoint of online decision making. After identifying the limitations of the prominent proportionality notion of Extended Justified Representation (EJR) in the online domain, the work proposes a set of mechanisms that merge techniques from online algorithms with rules from social choice -- such as the Method of Equal Shares and the Nash Rule -- and supports them through both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluation.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 30 of its 48 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Nov 2025.
Builds on
30 of 48 references.
References · 30
- 2014Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Votingcited by 42
- 2020Fair Algorithms for Multi-Agent Multi-Armed Banditscited by 41
- 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
- 2020Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilitiescited by 37
- 2016Proportional Justified Representationcited by 25
- 2023Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Votingcited by 23
- 2018Fair Allocation of Indivisible Public Goodscited by 22
- 2016Fair Public Decision Makingcited by 21
- 2019Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarismcited by 21
- 2016The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problemcited by 14
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2022Representation with Incomplete Votescited by 13
18 more
- 2023Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysiscited by 13
- 2022Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Votingcited by 12
- 2023Proportional Fairness in Clustering: A Social Choice Perspectivecited by 12
- 2022Online Approval Committee Electionscited by 9
- 2017Fair Knapsackcited by 8
- 2021Putting a Compass on the Map of Electionscited by 7
- 2023Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice: A Case Study of (Over-)Representation in the Polkadot Blockchaincited by 7
- 2020Random-Order Modelscited by 6
- 2022Expected Frequency Matrices of Elections: Computation, Geometry, and Preference Learningcited by 5
- 2022Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalitiescited by 5
- 2023Completing Priceable Committees: Utilitarian and Representation Guarantees for Proportional Multiwinner Votingcited by 5
- 2024Properties of the Mallows Model Depending on the Number of Alternatives: A Warning for an Experimentalistcited by 4
- 2024Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspendingcited by 4
- 2024Fair Secretaries with Unfair Predictionscited by 4
- 2022Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goodscited by 3
- 2023Participatory Budgeting Design for the Real Worldcited by 2
- 2025Proportional Selection in Networkscited by 1
- 2025Robust Committee Voting, or The Other Side of Representationcited by 1
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