mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending

arXiv 2409.15005 ↗First posted 23 Sep 2024cs.GT cs.AI cs.MAcited by 4

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Abstract (arXiv)

In participatory budgeting (PB), voters decide through voting which subset of projects to fund within a given budget. Proportionality in the context of PB is crucial to ensure equal treatment of all groups of voters. However, pure proportional rules can sometimes lead to suboptimal outcomes. We introduce the Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending (BOS Equal Shares), a robust variant of Equal Shares that balances proportionality and efficiency. BOS Equal Shares addresses inefficiencies implied by strict proportionality axioms, yet the rule still provides fairness guarantees, similar to the original Method of Equal Shares. Our extensive empirical analysis on real-world PB instances shows excellent performance of BOS Equal Shares across several metrics. In the course of the analysis, we also present and examine a fractional variant of the Method of Equal Shares which allows for partial funding of projects.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 17 of its 26 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2024.

Builds on

17 of 26 references.

References · 17

  1. 2014Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Votingcited by 42
  2. 2020Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferencescited by 37
  3. 2020Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilitiescited by 37
  4. 2023Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Votingcited by 23
  5. 2019Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarismcited by 21
  6. 2016The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problemcited by 14
  7. 2017Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferencescited by 14
  8. 2023Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysiscited by 13
  9. 2023The (Computational) Social Choice Take on Indivisible Participatory Budgetingcited by 11
  10. 2020A verifiably secure and proportional committee election rulecited by 6
  11. 2023Proportionality in Approval-Based Participatory Budgetingcited by 5
  12. 2021Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearingcited by 4
5 more
  1. 2022Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goodscited by 3
  2. 2021Truthful Cake Sharingcited by 2
  3. 2022Proportional Budget Allocations: Towards a Systematizationcited by 2
  4. 2023Participatory Budgeting Design for the Real Worldcited by 2
  5. 2024Maximum Flow is Fair: A Network Flow Approach to Committee Votingcited by 2

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 1.

4 papers.

  1. 2025Proportional Selection in Networkscited by 1
  2. 2025Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst for Democratic Resilience: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguardingcited by 1
  3. 2025Fairness in the Multi-Secretary Problemcited by 0
  4. 2026A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilitiescited by 0