mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Probe-based Fine-tuning for Reducing Toxicity

arXiv 2510.21531 ↗First posted 24 Oct 2025cs.LGcited by 2

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Abstract (arXiv)

Probes trained on model activations can detect undesirable behaviors like deception or biases that are difficult to identify from outputs alone. This makes them useful detectors to identify misbehavior. Furthermore, they are also valuable training signals, since they not only reward outputs, but also good internal processes for arriving at that output. However, training against interpretability tools raises a fundamental concern: when a monitor becomes a training target, it may cease to be reliable (Goodhart's Law). We propose two methods for training against probes based on Supervised Fine-tuning and Direct Preference Optimization. We conduct an initial exploration of these methods in a testbed for reducing toxicity and evaluate the amount by which probe accuracy drops when training against them. To retain the accuracy of probe-detectors after training, we attempt (1) to train against an ensemble of probes, (2) retain held-out probes that aren't used for training, and (3) retrain new probes after training. First, probe-based preference optimization unexpectedly preserves probe detectability better than classifier-based methods, suggesting the preference learning objective incentivizes maintaining rather than obfuscating relevant representations. Second, probe diversity provides minimal practical benefit - simply retraining probes after optimization recovers high detection accuracy. Our findings suggest probe-based training can be viable for certain alignment methods, though probe ensembles are largely unnecessary when retraining is feasible.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 9 of its 12 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 24 Oct 2025.

Builds on

9 of 12 references.

References · 9

  1. 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,380
  2. 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 8,065
  3. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
  4. 2025Persona Vectors: Monitoring and Controlling Character Traits in Language Modelscited by 345
  5. 2025Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probescited by 68
  6. 2024Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defensescited by 45
  7. 2025RL-Obfuscation: Can Language Models Learn to Evade Latent-Space Monitors?cited by 24
  8. 2023A benchmark for toxic comment classification on Civil Comments datasetcited by 11
  9. 2025Preference Learning with Lie Detectors can Induce Honesty or Evasioncited by 9

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

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  1. 2026Probe-Based Data Attribution: Discovering and Mitigating Undesirable Behaviors in LLM Post-Training
  2. 2025Linear probes rely on textual evidence: Results from leakage mitigation studies in language models
  3. 2026Prompted to Discriminate: Generalizing Malicious-Input Probes in the Wild
  4. 2026Do All LLMs Know When They're Being Harmful? A Reproducibility Study of Latent-Space Safety Probes Across Model Families
  5. 2025Aligned Probing: Relating Toxic Behavior and Model Internals
  6. 2025DAPI: Domain Adaptive Toxicity Probe Vector Intervention for Fine-Grained Detoxification
  7. 2025Redefining Experts: Interpretable Decomposition of Language Models for Toxicity Mitigation
  8. 2025Towards Inclusive Toxic Content Moderation: Addressing Vulnerabilities to Adversarial Attacks in Toxicity Classifiers Tackling LLM-generated Content