mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Linear probes rely on textual evidence: Results from leakage mitigation studies in language models

arXiv 2509.21344 ↗First posted 16 Sep 2025cs.AI cs.CL cs.LGcited by 2

On the map: Mechanistic interpretability → Probing deception, bias and beliefs

Abstract (arXiv)

White-box monitors are a popular technique for detecting potentially harmful behaviours in language models. While they perform well in general, their effectiveness in detecting text-ambiguous behaviour is disputed. In this work, we find evidence that removing textual evidence of a behaviour significantly decreases probe performance. The AUROC reduction ranges from 10- to 30-point depending on the setting. We evaluate probe monitors across three setups (Sandbagging, Sycophancy, and Bias), finding that when probes rely on textual evidence of the target behaviour (such as system prompts or CoT reasoning), performance degrades once these tokens are filtered. This filtering procedure is standard practice for output monitor evaluation. As further evidence of this phenomenon, we train Model Organisms which produce outputs without any behaviour verbalisations. We validate that probe performance on Model Organisms is substantially lower than unfiltered evaluations: 0.57 vs 0.74 AUROC for Bias, and 0.57 vs 0.94 AUROC for Sandbagging. Our findings suggest that linear probes may be brittle in scenarios where they must detect non-surface-level patterns.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Probing deception, bias and beliefs, one of 13 directions in Mechanistic interpretability. Builds on 20 of its 37 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Sep 2025.

Builds on

20 of 37 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probes5 Feb

Other references · 19

  1. 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,963
  2. 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,642
  3. 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,336
  4. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  5. 2021A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignmentcited by 1,055
  6. 2024Training Large Language Models to Reason in a Continuous Latent Spacecited by 797
  7. 2023LMSYS-Chat-1M: A Large-Scale Real-World LLM Conversation Datasetcited by 461
  8. 2024Mechanistic Interpretability for AI Safety -- A Reviewcited by 422
  9. 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
  10. 2025Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safetycited by 249
  11. 2023How to Catch an AI Liar: Lie Detection in Black-Box LLMs by Asking Unrelated Questionscited by 83
  12. 2025Auditing language models for hidden objectivescited by 83
7 more
  1. 2025SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agentscited by 71
  2. 2025International AI Safety Reportcited by 67
  3. 2025Detecting High-Stakes Interactions with Activation Probescited by 53
  4. 2024What Features in Prompts Jailbreak LLMs? Investigating the Mechanisms Behind Attackscited by 29
  5. 2024Lessons from Studying Two-Hop Latent Reasoningcited by 17
  6. 2024Poser: Unmasking Alignment Faking LLMs by Manipulating Their Internalscited by 13
  7. 2025Combining Cost-Constrained Runtime Monitors for AI Safetycited by 10

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026The Knowing-Saying Gap: When Probes See Errors that Confidence Misses
  2. 2025Beyond Black-Box Obfuscation: Mechanistic Analysis and Defense of White-Box Monitors
  3. 2025Aligned Probing: Relating Toxic Behavior and Model Internals
  4. 2026The Calls are Coming from Inside the Model: Investigating Probe-based Detection of Tool-Calling Errors in LLMs
  5. 2024An Auditing Test To Detect Behavioral Shift in Language Models
  6. 2026When Do Internal Probes Beat Reading the Answer? Miscalibrated Readouts and Behavior-Concealed Knowledge in Language Models
  7. 2026Do Activation Monitors Survive Model Updates? Benchmarking, Predicting, and Repairing Activation-Monitor Staleness
  8. 2026Decodability is Not Causality: Dissociating Probe Readouts from Behavioral Drivers via SAE Decomposition