Corrigibility Transformation: Constructing Goals That Accept Updates
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
An AI agent will learn a desired goal more effectively if it does not resist the training process, but many partially learned goals incentivize an AI to avoid further goal updates. We would like goals to be corrigible, meaning they allow changes requested through designated channels, so that we can confidently correct errors and shut down the AI if necessary. Despite this being a crucial safety property, the existing literature does not specify goals that are both corrigible and competitive with alternatives. We introduce a transformation that constructs a corrigible version of nearly any goal, without sacrificing performance. This is done by eliciting predictions of reward conditional on costlessly preventing updates, and having that target be pursued myopically. These goals are then shown to lead to optimal performance among the class of corrigible goals, to incentivize allowing mid-action overrides, and to disincentivize deliberate self-modification. Empirically, they induce corrigible behavior in gridworld settings and for language models when applied at the prompt level.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 17 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Oct 2025.
Builds on
17 of 34 references.
References · 17
- 2018Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research directioncited by 447
- 2019Risks from Learned Optimization in Advanced Machine Learning Systemscited by 258
- 2022The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspectivecited by 258
- 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threatscited by 158
- 2022Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goalscited by 126
- 2016The Off-Switch Gamecited by 97
- 2024Reinforcement Learning for LLM Post-Training: A Surveycited by 92
- 2025Utility Engineering: Analyzing and Controlling Emergent Value Systems in AIscited by 67
- 2018Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignmentcited by 62
- 2025Gradual Disempowerment: Systemic Existential Risks from Incremental AI Developmentcited by 46
- 2019Conservative Agency via Attainable Utility Preservationcited by 35
- 2024AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functionscited by 33
5 more
- 2025Why Do Some Language Models Fake Alignment While Others Don't?cited by 20
- 2025MONA: Myopic Optimization with Non-myopic Approval Can Mitigate Multi-step Reward Hackingcited by 19
- 2020Pessimism About Unknown Unknowns Inspires Conservatismcited by 13
- 2020AGI Agent Safety by Iteratively Improving the Utility Functioncited by 8
- 2024The Partially Observable Off-Switch Gamecited by 5
Built on by
Not cited yet.