The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain

In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions (PGA) to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional equilibrium-based game-theoretic models struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment. While auction theory provides equilibrium solutions for sealed-bid formats under incomplete information, these models typically assume known bidder value distributions and stationary competition--assumptions that are difficult to satisfy in dynamic, sub-second auctions where competitor presence and strategies evolve rapidly. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent achieves 49% Maximum-Profit Capture when deployed alongside existing searchers and a 43% relative profit improvement over the historical market leader in counterfactual replacement, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies.