AI Alignment Strategies from a Risk Perspective: Independent Safety Mechanisms or Shared Failures?
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Abstract (arXiv)
AI alignment research aims to develop techniques to ensure that AI systems do not cause harm. However, every alignment technique has failure modes, which are conditions in which there is a non-negligible chance that the technique fails to provide safety. As a strategy for risk mitigation, the AI safety community has increasingly adopted a defense-in-depth framework: Conceding that there is no single technique which guarantees safety, defense-in-depth consists in having multiple redundant protections against safety failure, such that safety can be maintained even if some protections fail. However, the success of defense-in-depth depends on how (un)correlated failure modes are across alignment techniques. For example, if all techniques had the exact same failure modes, the defense-in-depth approach would provide no additional protection at all. In this paper, we analyze 7 representative alignment techniques and 7 failure modes to understand the extent to which they overlap. We then discuss our results' implications for understanding the current level of risk and how to prioritize AI alignment research in the future.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 45 of its 65 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Oct 2025.
Builds on
45 of 65 references.
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33 more
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