Murphys Laws of AI Alignment: Why the Gap Always Wins
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Reward modeling and RLHF
Abstract (arXiv)
We study reinforcement learning from human feedback under misspecification. Sometimes human feedback is systematically wrong on certain types of inputs, like a broken compass that points the wrong way in specific regions. We prove that when feedback is biased on a fraction alpha of contexts with bias strength epsilon, any learning algorithm needs exponentially many samples exp(n*alpha*epsilon^2) to distinguish between two possible "true" reward functions that differ only on these problematic contexts. However, if you can identify where feedback is unreliable (a "calibration oracle"), you can focus your limited questions there and overcome the exponential barrier with just O(1/(alpha*epsilon^2)) queries. This quantifies why alignment is hard: rare edge cases with subtly biased feedback create an exponentially hard learning problem unless you know where to look. The gap between what we optimize (proxy from human feedback) and what we want (true objective) is fundamentally limited by how common the problematic contexts are (alpha), how wrong the feedback is there (epsilon), and how much the true objectives disagree there (gamma). Murphy's Law for AI alignment: the gap always wins unless you actively route around misspecification.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Reward modeling and RLHF, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 16 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Sep 2025.
Builds on
16 of 27 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
- 2025RLHS: Mitigating Misalignment in RLHF with Hindsight Simulation15 Jan
- 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback27 Jul
- 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model29 May
Other references · 13
- 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
- 2016Concrete Problems in AI Safetycited by 1,642
- 2020Aligning AI With Shared Human Valuescited by 723
- 2023Mitigating the Alignment Tax of RLHFcited by 183
- 2018Categorizing Variants of Goodhart's Lawcited by 149
- 2024Language Models Learn to Mislead Humans via RLHFcited by 124
- 2025Safety Tax: Safety Alignment Makes Your Large Reasoning Models Less Reasonablecited by 122
- 2024Controllable Preference Optimization: Toward Controllable Multi-Objective Alignmentcited by 107
- 2024Group Robust Preference Optimization in Reward-free RLHFcited by 95
- 2025AI Safety for Everyonecited by 14
- 2025Whose View of Safety? A Deep DIVE Dataset for Pluralistic Alignment of Text-to-Image Modelscited by 11
- 2025AegisLLM: Scaling Agentic Systems for Self-Reflective Defense in LLM Securitycited by 10
1 more
- 2025Paying Alignment Tax with Contrastive Learningcited by 3
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 4.
5 papers.
- 2025The Alignment Bottleneckcited by 1
- 2026Alignment Backfire: Language-Dependent Reversal of Safety Interventions Across 16 Languages in LLM Multi-Agent Systemscited by 1
- 2026Qualixar OS: A Universal Operating System for AI Agent Orchestrationcited by 0
- 2026The Behavioral Credibility Trilemma: When Calibrated Autonomy Becomes Impossiblecited by 0
- 2026EvalSafetyGap: A Hybrid Survey and Conceptual Framework for LLM Evaluation-Safety Failurescited by 0
- 2026EvalSafetyGap: A Hybrid Survey and Conceptual Framework for LLM Evaluation-Safety Failures29 Jun 2026
- 2026The Behavioral Credibility Trilemma: When Calibrated Autonomy Becomes Impossible25 May 2026
- 2026Qualixar OS: A Universal Operating System for AI Agent Orchestration7 Apr 2026
- 2026Alignment Backfire: Language-Dependent Reversal of Safety Interventions Across 16 Languages in LLM Multi-Agent Systems5 Mar 2026
- 2025The Alignment Bottleneck19 Sep 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Evaluating Risks in Weak-to-Strong Alignment: A Bias-Variance Perspective
- 2026Objective Decoupling in Social Reinforcement Learning: Recovering Ground Truth from Sycophantic Majorities
- 2025Position: The Complexity of Perfect AI Alignment -- Formalizing the RLHF Trilemma
- 2026Revisiting scaling laws for reward optimization
- 2024Aligning AI Agents via Information-Directed Sampling
- 2026Distortion of AI Alignment Revisited: RLHF is a Decent Utilitarian Aligner
- 2024AI Alignment through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback? Contradictions and Limitations
- 2026Reinforcement Learning Towards Broadly and Persistently Beneficial Models