LLM-driven Provenance Forensics for Threat Investigation and Detection
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
We introduce PROVSEEK, an LLM-powered agentic framework for automated provenance-driven forensic analysis and threat intelligence extraction. PROVSEEK employs specialized toolchains to dynamically retrieve relevant context by generating precise, context-aware queries that fuse knowledge from threat reports with evidence from system provenance data. The framework resolves provenance queries, orchestrates multiple role-specific agents, and synthesizes structured, ground-truth verifiable forensic summaries. By combining agent orchestration with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, data-guided filtration using a behavioral model, PROVSEEK enables adaptive multi-step analysis that iteratively refines hypotheses, verifies supporting evidence, and produces scalable, interpretable forensic explanations of attack behaviors. PROVSEEK is designed for automated threat investigation without task-specific training data, enabling forensic-style investigation even when no prior knowledge of the environment. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on publicly available DARPA datasets, demonstrating that PROVSEEK outperforms retrieval-based methods for the intelligence extraction task, achieving a 34% improvement in contextual precision/recall; and for threat detection task, PROVSEEK achieves 22%/29% higher precision/recall compared to both a baseline agent approach and State-Of-The-Art (SOTA) Provenance-based Intrusion Detection System (PIDS). In our scalability study, we show that PROVSEEK increases token usage by 1.42x and latency by 1.63x as the database size increases 50x, making it optimal for large-scale deployment. We also conducted an ablation and error analysis study to show how different components of PROVSEEK affect the detection performance.
Key facts. Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. First posted on arXiv 29 Aug 2025.
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 2; 2026: 3.
5 papers.
- 2025A Survey on Agentic Security: Applications, Threats and Defensescited by 20
- 2025Distributional AGI Safetycited by 12
- 2026SoK: Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): Taxonomy, Architectures, Evaluation, and Research Directionscited by 8
- 2026(EC)2: Event-Centric Explainability for Cybersecurity Through Multi-Agent LLM Investigationscited by 0
- 2026CyberClear: A Benchmark for LLM Agent Systems on APT Attack Chain Provenancecited by 0
- 2026CyberClear: A Benchmark for LLM Agent Systems on APT Attack Chain Provenance26 Sep 2026
- 2026(EC)2: Event-Centric Explainability for Cybersecurity Through Multi-Agent LLM Investigations28 Jul 2026
- 2026SoK: Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): Taxonomy, Architectures, Evaluation, and Research Directions7 Mar 2026
- 2025Distributional AGI Safety18 Dec 2025
- 2025A Survey on Agentic Security: Applications, Threats and Defenses7 Oct 2025
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- 2026Minos: A Multi-Agent Collaborative Framework for Provenance-Based Backward Tracking
- 2026From Agent Traces to Trust: A Survey of Evidence Tracing and Execution Provenance in LLM Agents
- 2026READER: Dynamic LLM Provenance from Query-Varying Interactions
- 2026CHARLIE: An On-Premise Multi-Agent Retrieval-Augmented Generation System for Evidential Reasoning in Forensic Science
- 2026Towards Agentic Investigation of Security Alerts
- 2026The Granularity Mismatch in Agent Security: Argument-Level Provenance Solves Enforcement and Isolates the LLM Reasoning Bottleneck
- 2026DiagChain: A Diagnostic Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Agents on Evidence-Grounded Attack Chain Reconstruction
- 2024ProveRAG: Provenance-Driven Vulnerability Analysis with Automated Retrieval-Augmented LLMs