Modeling the Economic Impacts of AI Openness Regulation
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Abstract (arXiv)
Regulatory frameworks, such as the EU AI Act, encourage openness of general-purpose AI models by offering legal exemptions for "open-source" models. Despite this legislative attention on openness, the definition of open-source foundation models remains ambiguous. This paper models the strategic interactions among the creator of a general-purpose model (the generalist) and the entity that fine-tunes the general-purpose model to a specialized domain or task (the specialist), in response to regulatory requirements on model openness. We present a stylized model of the regulator's choice of an open-source definition to evaluate which AI openness standards will establish appropriate economic incentives for developers. Our results characterize market equilibria -- specifically, upstream model release decisions and downstream fine-tuning efforts -- under various openness regulations and present a range of effective regulatory penalties and open-source thresholds. Overall, we find the model's baseline performance determines when increasing the regulatory penalty vs. the open-source threshold will significantly alter the generalist's release strategy. Our model provides a theoretical foundation for AI governance decisions around openness and enables evaluation and refinement of practical open-source policies.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 7 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Jul 2025.
Builds on
7 of 34 references.
References · 7
- 2023The Gradient of Generative AI Release: Methods and Considerationscited by 63
- 2020The Fundamental Principles of Reproducibilitycited by 17
- 2023Fine-Tuning Games: Bargaining and Adaptation for General-Purpose Modelscited by 17
- 2024Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulationcited by 14
- 2025Fairshare Data Pricing via Data Valuation for Large Language Modelscited by 8
- 2025The Backfiring Effect of Weak AI Safety Regulationcited by 3
- 2025Flattening Supply Chains: When do Technology Improvements lead to Disintermediation?cited by 2
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
3 papers.
- 2026Strategic Self-Consistency24 Sep 2026
- 2025The Economics of AI Foundation Models: Openness, Competition, and Governance17 Oct 2025
- 2025Anatomy of a Machine Learning Ecosystem: 2 Million Models on Hugging Face9 Aug 2025