An Example Safety Case for Safeguards Against Misuse
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Abstract (arXiv)
Existing evaluations of AI misuse safeguards provide a patchwork of evidence that is often difficult to connect to real-world decisions. To bridge this gap, we describe an end-to-end argument (a "safety case") that misuse safeguards reduce the risk posed by an AI assistant to low levels. We first describe how a hypothetical developer red teams safeguards, estimating the effort required to evade them. Then, the developer plugs this estimate into a quantitative "uplift model" to determine how much barriers introduced by safeguards dissuade misuse (https://www.aimisusemodel.com/). This procedure provides a continuous signal of risk during deployment that helps the developer rapidly respond to emerging threats. Finally, we describe how to tie these components together into a simple safety case. Our work provides one concrete path -- though not the only path -- to rigorously justifying AI misuse risks are low.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 13 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 23 May 2025.
Builds on
13 of 34 references.
References · 13
- 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,912
- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 3,050
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,651
- 2023Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automaticallycited by 672
- 2024The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearningcited by 509
- 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 181
- 2024Safety Cases: How to Justify the Safety of Advanced AI Systemscited by 48
- 2022Structured access: an emerging paradigm for safe AI deploymentcited by 41
- 2025A sketch of an AI control safety casecited by 39
- 2024Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI schemingcited by 33
- 2024Does Unlearning Truly Unlearn? A Black Box Evaluation of LLM Unlearning Methodscited by 26
- 2024Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argumentcited by 19
1 more
- 2024Safety cases for frontier AIcited by 18
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 1; 2026: 3.
4 papers.
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Riskscited by 1
- 2026Clear, Compelling Arguments: Rethinking the Foundations of Frontier AI Safety Casescited by 1
- 2026BELLS-O: Evaluating the Operational Trade-offs of LLM Supervision Systemscited by 1
- 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?cited by 0
- 2026The Safeguard Worked. Is the LLM System Safer?1 Sep 2026
- 2026BELLS-O: Evaluating the Operational Trade-offs of LLM Supervision Systems12 Jun 2026
- 2026Clear, Compelling Arguments: Rethinking the Foundations of Frontier AI Safety Cases8 Mar 2026
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Risks8 Aug 2025
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026A Translational Note on AI Safety Evaluation
- 2024A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming
- 2025Safety by Measurement: A Systematic Literature Review of AI Safety Evaluation Methods
- 2026The safety failures we are not instrumenting: a perspective on hidden safety-critical challenges in modern AI systems
- 2024AI Risk Management Should Incorporate Both Safety and Security
- 2026Evaluating Human-AI Safety: A Framework for Measuring Harmful Capability Uplift
- 2026Understanding as an Explicit and Assessable Component of Frontier AI Safety Decisions ↗
- 2025A Red Teaming Roadmap Towards System-Level Safety