mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Full Swap Regret and Discretized Calibration

arXiv 2502.09332 ↗First posted 13 Feb 2025cs.LG cs.GTcited by 15

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into d-dimensional space and payoffs are given by bilinear functions of these embeddings. We provide an efficient learning algorithm for this setting that incurs at most tildeO(T(d+1)/(d+3)) swap regret after T rounds. To achieve this, we introduce a new online learning problem we call full swap regret minimization. In this problem, a learner repeatedly takes a (randomized) action in a bounded convex d-dimensional action set K and then receives a loss from the adversary, with the goal of minimizing their regret with respect to the worst-case swap function mapping K to K. For varied assumptions about the convexity and smoothness of the loss functions, we design algorithms with full swap regret bounds ranging from O(Td/(d+2)) to O(T(d+1)/(d+2)). Finally, we apply these tools to the problem of online forecasting to minimize calibration error, showing that several notions of calibration can be viewed as specific instances of full swap regret. In particular, we design efficient algorithms for online forecasting that guarantee at most O(T1/3) ℓ2-calibration error and O(max(√ε T, T1/3)) discretized-calibration error (when the forecaster is restricted to predicting multiples of ε).

Key facts. Cited by 15 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 20 of its 38 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 13 Feb 2025.

Builds on

20 of 38 references.

References · 20

  1. 2022Generative Adversarial Networkscited by 5,627
  2. 2019Strategizing against No-regret Learnerscited by 50
  3. 2023U-Calibration: Forecasting for an Unknown Agentcited by 46
  4. 2017Selling to a No-Regret Buyercited by 43
  5. 2020Stronger Calibration Lower Bounds via Sidesteppingcited by 38
  6. 2022Strategizing against Learners in Bayesian Gamescited by 34
  7. 2023Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibriacited by 32
  8. 2023Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agentscited by 25
  9. 2024Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agentscited by 25
  10. 2023Is Learning in Games Good for the Learners?cited by 20
  11. 2023Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyerscited by 19
  12. 2024Breaking the T2/3 Barrier for Sequential Calibrationcited by 19
8 more
  1. 2020Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Priorcited by 18
  2. 2022Efficient Phi-Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games via Online Mirror Descentcited by 15
  3. 2024Calibration Error for Decision Makingcited by 13
  4. 2024Efficient Learning and Computation of Linear Correlated Equilibrium in General Convex Gamescited by 12
  5. 2023From External to Swap Regret 2.0: An Efficient Reduction and Oblivious Adversary for Large Action Spacescited by 11
  6. 2023Polynomial-Time Linear-Swap Regret Minimization in Imperfect-Information Sequential Gamescited by 9
  7. 2024Efficient Phi-Regret Minimization with Low-Degree Swap Deviations in Extensive-Form Gamescited by 6
  8. 2023Efficient Learning in Polyhedral Games via Best Response Oraclescited by 3

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 8; 2026: 7.

15 papers.

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