Supervision policies can shape long-term risk management in general-purpose AI models
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Abstract (arXiv)
The rapid proliferation and deployment of General-Purpose AI (GPAI) models, including large language models (LLMs), present unprecedented challenges for AI supervisory entities. We hypothesize that these entities will need to navigate an emergent ecosystem of risk and incident reporting, likely to exceed their supervision capacity. To investigate this, we develop a simulation framework parameterized by features extracted from the diverse landscape of risk, incident, or hazard reporting ecosystems, including community-driven platforms, crowdsourcing initiatives, and expert assessments. We evaluate four supervision policies: non-prioritized (first-come, first-served), random selection, priority-based (addressing the highest-priority risks first), and diversity-prioritized (balancing high-priority risks with comprehensive coverage across risk types). Our results indicate that while priority-based and diversity-prioritized policies are more effective at mitigating high-impact risks, particularly those identified by experts, they may inadvertently neglect systemic issues reported by the broader community. This oversight can create feedback loops that amplify certain types of reporting while discouraging others, leading to a skewed perception of the overall risk landscape. We validate our simulation results with several real-world datasets, including one with over a million ChatGPT interactions, of which more than 150,000 conversations were identified as risky. This validation underscores the complex trade-offs inherent in AI risk supervision and highlights how the choice of risk management policies can shape the future landscape of AI risks across diverse GPAI models used in society.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 19 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 Jan 2025.
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19 of 35 references.
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7 more
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