Adversarial Hubness in Multi-Modal Retrieval
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Abstract (arXiv)
Hubness is a phenomenon in high-dimensional vector spaces where a point from the natural distribution is unusually close to many other points. This is a well-known problem in information retrieval that causes some items to accidentally (and incorrectly) appear relevant to many queries. In this paper, we investigate how attackers can exploit hubness to turn any image or audio input in a multi-modal retrieval system into an adversarial hub. Adversarial hubs can be used to inject universal adversarial content (e.g., spam) that will be retrieved in response to thousands of different queries, and also for targeted attacks on queries related to specific, attacker-chosen concepts. We present a method for creating adversarial hubs and evaluate the resulting hubs on benchmark multi-modal retrieval datasets and an image-to-image retrieval system implemented by Pinecone, a popular vector database. For example, in text-caption-to-image retrieval, a single adversarial hub, generated using 100 random queries, is retrieved as the top-1 most relevant image for more than 21,000 out of 25,000 test queries (by contrast, the most common natural hub is the top-1 response to only 102 queries), demonstrating the strong generalization capabilities of adversarial hubs. We also investigate whether techniques for mitigating natural hubness can also mitigate adversarial hubs, and show that they are not effective against hubs that target queries related to specific concepts.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 18 Dec 2024.
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 1; 2026: 7.
9 papers.
- 2024GASLITEing the Retrieval: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Dense Embedding-based Searchcited by 20
- 2026Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systemscited by 16
- 2026Adversarial Hubness Detector: Detecting Hubness Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systemscited by 2
- 2026One Single Hub Text Breaks CLIP: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Cross-Modal Encoders via Hubnesscited by 2
- 2025Hacking Neural Evaluation Metrics with Single Hub Textcited by 1
- 2026CLIMP: Contrastive Language-Image Mamba Pretrainingcited by 1
- 2026Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generationcited by 1
- 2026When Global Gating Is Enough: Admission-Time Hubness Control in Anisotropic Vector Retrieval Systemscited by 1
- 2026Coverage Is Not Containment: A Fundamental Limit of Admission-Time Defenses Against Coordinated Poisoning of Vector Retrievalcited by 0
- 2026Coverage Is Not Containment: A Fundamental Limit of Admission-Time Defenses Against Coordinated Poisoning of Vector Retrieval17 Aug 2026
- 2026When Global Gating Is Enough: Admission-Time Hubness Control in Anisotropic Vector Retrieval Systems18 Jun 2026
- 2026One Single Hub Text Breaks CLIP: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Cross-Modal Encoders via Hubness30 Apr 2026
- 2026Adversarial Hubness Detector: Detecting Hubness Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems25 Feb 2026
- 2026Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation10 Feb 2026
- 2026Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems11 Jan 2026
- 2026CLIMP: Contrastive Language-Image Mamba Pretraining11 Jan 2026
- 2025Hacking Neural Evaluation Metrics with Single Hub Text18 Dec 2025
- 2024GASLITEing the Retrieval: Exploring Vulnerabilities in Dense Embedding-based Search30 Dec 2024