mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Adversarial Hubness Detector: Detecting Hubness Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

arXiv 2602.22427 ↗First posted 25 Feb 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 2

On the map: Retrieval-augmented generation → Privacy and security of RAG

Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are essential to contemporary AI applications, allowing large language models to obtain external knowledge via vector similarity search. Nevertheless, these systems encounter a significant security flaw: hubness - items that frequently appear in the top-k retrieval results for a disproportionately high number of varied queries. These hubs can be exploited to introduce harmful content, alter search rankings, bypass content filtering, and decrease system performance. We introduce hubscan, an open-source security scanner that evaluates vector indices and embeddings to identify hubs in RAG systems. Hubscan presents a multi-detector architecture that integrates: (1) robust statistical hubness detection utilizing median/Median Absolute Deviation (MAD)-based z-scores, (2) cluster spread analysis to assess cross-cluster retrieval patterns, (3) stability testing under query perturbations, and (4) domain-aware and modality-aware detection for category-specific and cross-modal attacks. Our solution accommodates several vector databases (FAISS, Pinecone, Qdrant, Weaviate) and offers versatile retrieval techniques, including vector similarity, hybrid search, and lexical matching with reranking capabilities. We evaluate hubscan on Food-101, MS-COCO, and FiQA adversarial hubness benchmarks constructed using state-of-the-art gradient-optimized and centroid-based hub generation methods. Hubscan achieves 90% recall at a 0.2% alert budget and 100% recall at 0.4%, with adversarial hubs ranking above the 99.8th percentile. In testing, domain-scoped scanning recovered 100% of targeted attacks that evaded global detection. Production validation on 1M real web documents from MS MARCO demonstrates significant score separation between clean documents and adversarial content.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation. Builds on 9 of its 26 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Feb 2026.

Builds on

9 of 26 references.

References · 9

  1. 2014Microsoft COCO: Common Objects in Contextcited by 17,498
  2. 2020Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Taskscited by 9,160
  3. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  4. 2019Passage Re-ranking with BERTcited by 629
  5. 2017Word Translation Without Parallel Datacited by 480
  6. 2023Balance Act: Mitigating Hubness in Cross-Modal Retrieval with Query and Gallery Bankscited by 20
  7. 2022RetrievalGuard: Provably Robust 1-Nearest Neighbor Image Retrievalcited by 15
  8. 2024Adversarial Hubness in Multi-Modal Retrievalcited by 9
  9. 2025NeighborRetr: Balancing Hub Centrality in Cross-Modal Retrievalcited by 6

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026RAG-CT: Mitigating Privacy Risks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems via Scanning Prompt Distribution
  2. 2026Retrieved But Not Reliable: A Survey on Attacks, and Defenses in Retrieval-Augmented Generation
  3. 2026Defending Retrieval-Augmented Intrusion Detection Against Knowledge Poisoning and Prompt Injection
  4. 2026Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation
  5. 2026Towards Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Comprehensive Review of Threats, Defenses and Benchmarks
  6. 2026Semantic Chameleon: Corpus-Dependent Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in RAG Systems
  7. 2025Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation against Poisoning Attacks
  8. 2026Security and Privacy in Retrieval-Augmented Generation: Architectures, Threats, Defenses, and Future Directions for Building Trustworthy Systems