Choice Between Partial Trajectories: Disentangling Goals from Beliefs
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Abstract (arXiv)
As AI agents generate increasingly sophisticated behaviors, manually encoding human preferences to guide these agents becomes more challenging. To address this, it has been suggested that agents instead learn preferences from human choice data. This approach requires a model of choice behavior that the agent can use to interpret the data. For choices between partial trajectories of states and actions, previous models assume choice probabilities are determined by the partial return or the cumulative advantage. We consider an alternative model based instead on the bootstrapped return, which adds to the partial return an estimate of the future return. Benefits of the bootstrapped return model stem from its treatment of human beliefs. Unlike partial return, choices based on bootstrapped return reflect human beliefs about the environment. Further, while recovering the reward function from choices based on cumulative advantage requires that those beliefs are correct, doing so from choices based on bootstrapped return does not. To motivate the bootstrapped return model, we formulate axioms and prove an Alignment Theorem. This result formalizes how, for a general class of preferences, such models are able to disentangle goals from beliefs. This ensures recovery of an aligned reward function when learning from choices based on bootstrapped return. The bootstrapped return model also affords greater robustness to choice behavior. Even when choices are based on partial return, learning via a bootstrapped return model recovers an aligned reward function. The same holds with choices based on the cumulative advantage if the human and the agent both adhere to correct and consistent beliefs about the environment. On the other hand, if choices are based on bootstrapped return, learning via partial return or cumulative advantage models does not generally produce an aligned reward function.
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References · 12
- 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,912
- 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 759
- 2018Reward learning from human preferences and demonstrations in Ataricited by 316
- 2016Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learningcited by 300
- 2022Models of human preference for learning reward functionscited by 54
- 2022Causal Confusion and Reward Misidentification in Preference-Based Reward Learningcited by 53
- 2019On the Feasibility of Learning, Rather than Assuming, Human Biases for Reward Inferencecited by 49
- 2015Learning the Preferences of Ignorant, Inconsistent Agentscited by 45
- 2018Where Do You Think You're Going?: Inferring Beliefs about Dynamics from Behaviorcited by 40
- 2019Deep Bayesian Reward Learning from Preferencescited by 28
- 2023Learning Optimal Advantage from Preferences and Mistaking it for Rewardcited by 19
- 2024When Your AIs Deceive You: Challenges of Partial Observability in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 17
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