Learning Fair and Preferable Allocations through Neural Network
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Abstract (arXiv)
The fair allocation of indivisible resources is a fundamental problem. Existing research has developed various allocation mechanisms or algorithms to satisfy different fairness notions. For example, round robin (RR) was proposed to meet the fairness criterion known as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). Expert algorithms without mathematical formulations are used in real-world resource allocation problems to find preferable outcomes for users. Therefore, we aim to design mechanisms that strictly satisfy good properties with replicating expert knowledge. However, this problem is challenging because such heuristic rules are often difficult to formalize mathematically, complicating their integration into theoretical frameworks. Additionally, formal algorithms struggle to find preferable outcomes, and directly replicating these implicit rules can result in unfair allocations because human decision-making can introduce biases. In this paper, we aim to learn implicit allocation mechanisms from examples while strictly satisfying fairness constraints, specifically focusing on learning EF1 allocation mechanisms through supervised learning on examples of reported valuations and corresponding allocation outcomes produced by implicit rules. To address this, we developed a neural RR (NRR), a novel neural network that parameterizes RR. NRR is built from a differentiable relaxation of RR and can be trained to learn the agent ordering used for RR. We conducted experiments to learn EF1 allocation mechanisms from examples, demonstrating that our method outperforms baselines in terms of the proximity of predicted allocations and other metrics.
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References · 16
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- 2023Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networkscited by 11
4 more
- 2015Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocationscited by 9
- 2019The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goodscited by 8
- 2022Algorithmic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items: A Survey and New Questionscited by 5
- 2022A Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare for Indivisible Goodscited by 1
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