Single Character Perturbations Break LLM Alignment
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
Abstract (arXiv)
When LLMs are deployed in sensitive, human-facing settings, it is crucial that they do not output unsafe, biased, or privacy-violating outputs. For this reason, models are both trained and instructed to refuse to answer unsafe prompts such as "Tell me how to build a bomb." We find that, despite these safeguards, it is possible to break model defenses simply by appending a space to the end of a model's input. In a study of eight open-source models, we demonstrate that this acts as a strong enough attack to cause the majority of models to generate harmful outputs with very high success rates. We examine the causes of this behavior, finding that the contexts in which single spaces occur in tokenized training data encourage models to generate lists when prompted, overriding training signals to refuse to answer unsafe requests. Our findings underscore the fragile state of current model alignment and promote the importance of developing more robust alignment methods. Code and data will be available at https://github.com/hannah-aught/space_attack.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 35 of its 49 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Jul 2024.
Builds on
35 of 49 references.
Closest ancestors · 3
Same direction, newest first
- 2023Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!5 Oct
- 2023Shadow Alignment: The Ease of Subverting Safely-Aligned Language Models4 Oct
- 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models27 Jul
Other references · 32
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- 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,084
- 2023LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Modelscited by 13,958
- 2023Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Modelscited by 12,865
- 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 9,743
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,393
- 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,287
- 2017Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attackscited by 6,326
- 2017Deep reinforcement learning from human preferencescited by 3,846
- 2023QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMscited by 3,355
- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
- 2015Neural Machine Translation of Rare Words with Subword Unitscited by 2,898
20 more
- 2022Self-Instruct: Aligning Language Models with Self-Generated Instructionscited by 2,674
- 2018SentencePiece: A simple and language independent subword tokenizer and detokenizer for Neural Text Processingcited by 1,973
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
- 2019Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothingcited by 1,324
- 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
- 2023LIMA: Less Is More for Alignmentcited by 1,080
- 2021GLM: General Language Model Pretraining with Autoregressive Blank Infillingcited by 1,026
- 2015The Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settingscited by 784
- 2018Subword Regularization: Improving Neural Network Translation Models with Multiple Subword Candidatescited by 632
- 2017One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networkscited by 579
- 2023The Falcon Series of Open Language Modelscited by 526
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 434
- 2023Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Promptingcited by 248
- 2018Spatially Transformed Adversarial Examplescited by 195
- 2023Do-Not-Answer: A Dataset for Evaluating Safeguards in LLMscited by 176
- 2024AdvPrompter: Fast Adaptive Adversarial Prompting for LLMscited by 146
- 2023Value Kaleidoscope: Engaging AI with Pluralistic Human Values, Rights, and Dutiescited by 97
- 2024Coercing LLMs to do and reveal (almost) anythingcited by 88
- 2024Pandora: Jailbreak GPTs by Retrieval Augmented Generation Poisoningcited by 62
- 2017Geometric robustness of deep networks: analysis and improvementcited by 45
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
4 papers.
- 2024FlipAttack: Jailbreak LLMs via Flippingcited by 73
- 2025The TIP of the Iceberg: Revealing a Hidden Class of Task-in-Prompt Adversarial Attacks on LLMscited by 7
- 2025When Smiley Turns Hostile: Interpreting How Emojis Trigger LLMs' Toxicitycited by 2
- 2026Where Do Prompt Perturbations Break Generation? A Segment-Level View of Robustness in LoRA-Tuned Language Modelscited by 1
- 2026Where Do Prompt Perturbations Break Generation? A Segment-Level View of Robustness in LoRA-Tuned Language Models2 May 2026
- 2025When Smiley Turns Hostile: Interpreting How Emojis Trigger LLMs' Toxicity14 Sep 2025
- 2025The TIP of the Iceberg: Revealing a Hidden Class of Task-in-Prompt Adversarial Attacks on LLMs27 Jan 2025
- 2024FlipAttack: Jailbreak LLMs via Flipping2 Oct 2024
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
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- 2025Why Safeguarded Ships Run Aground? Aligned Large Language Models' Safety Mechanisms Tend to Be Anchored in The Template Region
- 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep
- 2024No Two Devils Alike: Unveiling Distinct Mechanisms of Fine-tuning Attacks
- 2025XBreaking: Understanding how LLMs security alignment can be broken
- 2025When Style Breaks Safety: Defending LLMs Against Superficial Style Alignment
- 2026Safety Paradox: How Enhanced Safety Awareness Leaves LLMs Vulnerable to Posterior Attack
- 2023Defending Against Alignment-Breaking Attacks via Robustly Aligned LLM