Societal Adaptation to Advanced AI
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Abstract (arXiv)
Existing strategies for managing risks from advanced AI systems often focus on affecting what AI systems are developed and how they diffuse. However, this approach becomes less feasible as the number of developers of advanced AI grows, and impedes beneficial use-cases as well as harmful ones. In response, we urge a complementary approach: increasing societal adaptation to advanced AI, that is, reducing the expected negative impacts from a given level of diffusion of a given AI capability. We introduce a conceptual framework which helps identify adaptive interventions that avoid, defend against and remedy potentially harmful uses of AI systems, illustrated with examples in election manipulation, cyberterrorism, and loss of control to AI decision-makers. We discuss a three-step cycle that society can implement to adapt to AI. Increasing society's ability to implement this cycle builds its resilience to advanced AI. We conclude with concrete recommendations for governments, industry, and third-parties.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 27 of its 109 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 May 2024.
Builds on
27 of 109 references.
References · 27
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- 2024WildChat: 1M ChatGPT Interaction Logs in the Wildcited by 629
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15 more
- 2022Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governancecited by 67
- 2024On the Societal Impact of Open Foundation Modelscited by 65
- 2023The Gradient of Generative AI Release: Methods and Considerationscited by 63
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 7; 2026: 2.
10 papers.
- 2025Infrastructure for AI Agentscited by 41
- 2024Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulationcited by 14
- 2025The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Prioritiescited by 10
- 2026Measuring AI R&D Automationcited by 9
- 2025Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoffcited by 4
- 2025Against racing to AGI: Cooperation, deterrence, and catastrophic riskscited by 2
- 2025From Turing to Tomorrow: The UK's Approach to AI Regulationcited by 1
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Riskscited by 1
- 2025Societal Capacity Assessment Framework: Measuring Resilience to Inform Advanced AI Risk Managementcited by 1
- 2026Comprehensive AI governance requires addressing non-model gainscited by 1
- 2026Comprehensive AI governance requires addressing non-model gains1 May 2026
- 2026Measuring AI R&D Automation4 Mar 2026
- 2025Societal Capacity Assessment Framework: Measuring Resilience to Inform Advanced AI Risk Management26 Sep 2025
- 2025Dimensional Characterization and Pathway Modeling for Catastrophic AI Risks8 Aug 2025
- 2025Against racing to AGI: Cooperation, deterrence, and catastrophic risks29 Jul 2025
- 2025From Turing to Tomorrow: The UK's Approach to AI Regulation3 Jul 2025
- 2025The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities25 Jun 2025
- 2025Misalignment or misuse? The AGI alignment tradeoff4 Jun 2025
- 2025Infrastructure for AI Agents17 Jan 2025
- 2024Training Compute Thresholds: Features and Functions in AI Regulation17 May 2024