Faster Game Solving via Hyperparameter Schedules
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Abstract (arXiv)
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms are a foundational class of methods for solving imperfect-information games, with the time average of their iterates converging to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Prior state-of-the-art variants, Discounted CFR (DCFR) and Predictive CFR^+ (PCFR^+), achieved the fastest known practical performance by improving convergence rates over vanilla CFR through discounting early iterations with a fixed discounting scheme. More recently, Dynamic DCFR (DDCFR) introduced agent-learned dynamic discounting schemes to further accelerate convergence, at the cost of increased complexity. To address this, we propose Hyperparameter Schedules (HSs), a remarkably simple, training-free framework that dynamically adjusts CFR discounting over time. HSs aggressively downweight early updates and gradually transition to trusting late-stage strategies, leading to substantially faster convergence with only a few lines of code modifications. We show that HSs derived from just three small extensive-form games generalize effectively to 17 diverse games (including large-scale realistic poker) in both extensive-form and normal-form settings, without any game-specific tuning. Our method establishes a new state of the art for solving two-player zero-sum games.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 13 Apr 2024.
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Citing papers per year: 2025: 5; 2026: 2.
7 papers.
- 2026Discovering Multiagent Learning Algorithms with Large Language Modelscited by 4
- 2025Scale-Invariant Regret Matching and Online Learning with Optimal Convergence: Bridging Theory and Practice in Zero-Sum Gamescited by 3
- 2025Convergence of Regret Matching in Potential Games and Constrained Optimizationcited by 2
- 2026Parallelizing Counterfactual Regret Minimizationcited by 2
- 2025On the Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Gamescited by 1
- 2025Faster Game Solving via Asymmetry of Step Sizescited by 1
- 2025Approximating Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Games via Meta-Learningcited by 1
- 2026Parallelizing Counterfactual Regret Minimization14 May 2026
- 2026Discovering Multiagent Learning Algorithms with Large Language Models18 Feb 2026
- 2025Convergence of Regret Matching in Potential Games and Constrained Optimization20 Oct 2025
- 2025Scale-Invariant Regret Matching and Online Learning with Optimal Convergence: Bridging Theory and Practice in Zero-Sum Games6 Oct 2025
- 2025Approximating Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Games via Meta-Learning26 Apr 2025
- 2025Faster Game Solving via Asymmetry of Step Sizes17 Mar 2025
- 2025On the Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Games28 Jan 2025