Beyond Gradient and Priors in Privacy Attacks: Leveraging Pooler Layer Inputs of Language Models in Federated Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
Language models trained via federated learning (FL) demonstrate impressive capabilities in handling complex tasks while protecting user privacy. Recent studies indicate that leveraging gradient information and prior knowledge can potentially reveal training samples within FL setting. However, these investigations have overlooked the potential privacy risks tied to the intrinsic architecture of the models. This paper presents a two-stage privacy attack strategy that targets the vulnerabilities in the architecture of contemporary language models, significantly enhancing attack performance by initially recovering certain feature directions as additional supervisory signals. Our comparative experiments demonstrate superior attack performance across various datasets and scenarios, highlighting the privacy leakage risk associated with the increasingly complex architectures of language models. We call for the community to recognize and address these potential privacy risks in designing large language models.
Key facts. Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 28 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 Dec 2023.
Builds on
28 of 35 references.
References · 28
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16 more
- 2020iDLG: Improved Deep Leakage from Gradientscited by 382
- 2021See through Gradients: Image Batch Recovery via GradInversioncited by 326
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- 2019Federated Learning for Emoji Prediction in a Mobile Keyboardcited by 118
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 0; 2026: 4.
6 papers.
- 2024DAGER: Exact Gradient Inversion for Large Language Modelscited by 14
- 2024Seeing the Forest through the Trees: Data Leakage from Partial Transformer Gradientscited by 3
- 2026FedSpy-LLM: Towards Scalable and Generalizable Data Reconstruction Attacks from Gradients on LLMscited by 0
- 2026Position: Retire the "Positive Backdoor" Label -- Secret Alignment Requires Strict and Systematic Evaluationcited by 0
- 2026TIGER: Inverting Transformer Gradients via Embedding-Subspace Distance Optimizationcited by 0
- 2026PrivBench: A Holistic and Modular Benchmarking Platform for Evaluating Text-to-Text Privatizationcited by 0
- 2026PrivBench: A Holistic and Modular Benchmarking Platform for Evaluating Text-to-Text Privatization30 Aug 2026
- 2026TIGER: Inverting Transformer Gradients via Embedding-Subspace Distance Optimization16 Jun 2026
- 2026Position: Retire the "Positive Backdoor" Label -- Secret Alignment Requires Strict and Systematic Evaluation27 May 2026
- 2026FedSpy-LLM: Towards Scalable and Generalizable Data Reconstruction Attacks from Gradients on LLMs7 Apr 2026
- 2024Seeing the Forest through the Trees: Data Leakage from Partial Transformer Gradients3 Jun 2024
- 2024DAGER: Exact Gradient Inversion for Large Language Models24 May 2024