LLMs grasp morality in concept
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
Work in AI ethics and fairness has made much progress in regulating LLMs to reflect certain values, such as fairness, truth, and diversity. However, it has taken the problem of how LLMs might 'mean' anything at all for granted. Without addressing this, it is not clear what imbuing LLMs with such values even means. In response, we provide a general theory of meaning that extends beyond humans. We use this theory to explicate the precise nature of LLMs as meaning-agents. We suggest that the LLM, by virtue of its position as a meaning-agent, already grasps the constructions of human society (e.g. morality, gender, and race) in concept. Consequently, under certain ethical frameworks, currently popular methods for model alignment are limited at best and counterproductive at worst. Moreover, unaligned models may help us better develop our moral and social philosophy.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 16 of its 41 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Nov 2023.
Builds on
16 of 41 references.
References · 16
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4 more
- 2022Large Language Models and the Reverse Turing Testcited by 38
- 2019From Clustering to Cluster Explanations via Neural Networkscited by 34
- 2023Imitation versus Innovation: What children can do that large language and language-and-vision models cannot (yet)?cited by 13
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 0; 2026: 1.
2 papers.
- 2026Large Language Model Reasoning Failurescited by 21
- 2024Legally Binding but Unfair? Towards Assessing Fairness of Privacy Policiescited by 1
- 2026Large Language Model Reasoning Failures5 Feb 2026
- 2024Legally Binding but Unfair? Towards Assessing Fairness of Privacy Policies12 Mar 2024
Similar, not cited
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- 2024MoralBench: Moral Evaluation of LLMs
- 2023Ethical Reasoning over Moral Alignment: A Case and Framework for In-Context Ethical Policies in LLMs
- 2025Black Box Deployed -- Functional Criteria for Artificial Moral Agents in the LLM Era
- 2023Exploring the psychology of LLMs' Moral and Legal Reasoning
- 2026How do LLMs Evaluate Perceived Moral Agency? Investigating Moral Decision-Making in Human-Artificial Agents Interactions
- 2025The Greatest Good Benchmark: Measuring LLMs' Alignment with Utilitarian Moral Dilemmas