Nash Regret Guarantees for Linear Bandits
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Abstract (arXiv)
We obtain essentially tight upper bounds for a strengthened notion of regret in the stochastic linear bandits framework. The strengthening -- referred to as Nash regret -- is defined as the difference between the (a priori unknown) optimum and the geometric mean of expected rewards accumulated by the linear bandit algorithm. Since the geometric mean corresponds to the well-studied Nash social welfare (NSW) function, this formulation quantifies the performance of a bandit algorithm as the collective welfare it generates across rounds. NSW is known to satisfy fairness axioms and, hence, an upper bound on Nash regret provides a principled fairness guarantee. We consider the stochastic linear bandits problem over a horizon of T rounds and with set of arms X in ambient dimension d. Furthermore, we focus on settings in which the stochastic reward -- associated with each arm in X -- is a non-negative, nu-sub-Poisson random variable. For this setting, we develop an algorithm that achieves a Nash regret of Oleft( √fracdnuT log( T |X|)right). In addition, addressing linear bandit instances in which the set of arms X is not necessarily finite, we obtain a Nash regret upper bound of Oleft( fracd^frac54nu^frac12√T log(T)right). Since bounded random variables are sub-Poisson, these results hold for bounded, positive rewards. Our linear bandit algorithm is built upon the successive elimination method with novel technical insights, including tailored concentration bounds and the use of sampling via John ellipsoid in conjunction with the Kiefer-Wolfowitz optimal design.
Key facts. Cited by 9 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 10 of its 28 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Oct 2023.
Builds on
10 of 28 references.
References · 10
- 2016Fairness in Learning: Classic and Contextual Banditscited by 168
- 2015Multi-armed Bandit Models for the Optimal Design of Clinical Trials: Benefits and Challengescited by 114
- 2019Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problemcited by 78
- 2020Fair Algorithms for Multi-Agent Multi-Armed Banditscited by 41
- 2021Regret Minimization in Heavy-Tailed Banditscited by 25
- 2019A near-optimal algorithm for approximating the John Ellipsoidcited by 23
- 2018A Contextual-bandit-based Approach for Informed Decision-making in Clinical Trialscited by 18
- 2022Fairness and Welfare Quantification for Regret in Multi-Armed Banditscited by 17
- 2020My Fair Bandit: Distributed Learning of Max-Min Fairness with Multi-player Banditscited by 16
- 2021The Multiplicative Version of Azuma's Inequality, with an Application to Contention Analysiscited by 5
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 4; 2025: 2; 2026: 3.
9 papers.
- 2024No-Regret Learning for Fair Multi-Agent Social Welfare Optimizationcited by 8
- 2024p-Mean Regret for Stochastic Banditscited by 6
- 2024Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copiescited by 4
- 2024Stochastic Bandits for Egalitarian Assignmentcited by 4
- 2025Revisiting Social Welfare in Bandits: UCB is (Nearly) All You Needcited by 4
- 2025DP-NCB: Privacy Preserving Fair Banditscited by 2
- 2026Improved Algorithms for Nash Welfare in Linear Banditscited by 2
- 2026Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queriescited by 0
- 2026Multi-User Dueling Bandits: A Fair Approach using Nash Social Welfarecited by 0
- 2026Multi-User Dueling Bandits: A Fair Approach using Nash Social Welfare3 May 2026
- 2026Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries6 Feb 2026
- 2026Improved Algorithms for Nash Welfare in Linear Bandits30 Jan 2026
- 2025Revisiting Social Welfare in Bandits: UCB is (Nearly) All You Need24 Oct 2025
- 2025DP-NCB: Privacy Preserving Fair Bandits5 Aug 2025
- 2024p-Mean Regret for Stochastic Bandits14 Dec 2024
- 2024Stochastic Bandits for Egalitarian Assignment8 Oct 2024
- 2024Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies23 Aug 2024
- 2024No-Regret Learning for Fair Multi-Agent Social Welfare Optimization31 May 2024