Exploring Social Choice Mechanisms for Recommendation Fairness in SCRUF
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Abstract (arXiv)
Fairness problems in recommender systems often have a complexity in practice that is not adequately captured in simplified research formulations. A social choice formulation of the fairness problem, operating within a multi-agent architecture of fairness concerns, offers a flexible and multi-aspect alternative to fairness-aware recommendation approaches. Leveraging social choice allows for increased generality and the possibility of tapping into well-studied social choice algorithms for resolving the tension between multiple, competing fairness concerns. This paper explores a range of options for choice mechanisms in multi-aspect fairness applications using both real and synthetic data and shows that different classes of choice and allocation mechanisms yield different but consistent fairness / accuracy tradeoffs. We also show that a multi-agent formulation offers flexibility in adapting to user population dynamics.
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References · 13
- 2020FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platformscited by 77
- 2021Towards Long-term Fairness in Recommendationcited by 77
- 2017Multisided Fairness for Recommendationcited by 69
- 2020Controlling Fairness and Bias in Dynamic Learning-to-Rankcited by 67
- 2020Evaluating Stochastic Rankings with Expected Exposurecited by 53
- 2016Display Advertising with Real-Time Bidding (RTB) and Behavioural Targetingcited by 42
- 2013Real-time Bidding for Online Advertising: Measurement and Analysiscited by 32
- 2021Fairness in Information Access Systemscited by 27
- 2020Opportunistic Multi-aspect Fairness through Personalized Re-rankingcited by 11
- 2018Personalizing Fairness-aware Re-rankingcited by 9
- 2023Dynamic fairness-aware recommendation through multi-agent social choicecited by 9
- 2017The Conference Paper Assignment Problem: Using Order Weighted Averages to Assign Indivisible Goodscited by 6
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