mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations

arXiv 2307.09478 ↗First posted 14 Jul 2023cs.GT cs.DS cs.LGcited by 15

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Abstract (arXiv)

We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's transparency, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed variants) on the environment generating the bidder's valuations and competing bids. These minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.

Key facts. Cited by 15 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 49 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Jul 2023.

Builds on

24 of 49 references.

References · 24

  1. 2019Introduction to Multi-Armed Banditscited by 475
  2. 2013Bandits and Experts in Metric Spacescited by 63
  3. 2014Nonstochastic Multi-Armed Bandits with Graph-Structured Feedbackcited by 61
  4. 2021Smoothed Analysis with Adaptive Adversariescited by 57
  5. 2022Smoothed Online Learning is as Easy as Statistical Learningcited by 50
  6. 2020Smoothed Analysis of Online and Differentially Private Learningcited by 47
  7. 2015Online learning in repeated auctionscited by 39
  8. 2017Dispersion for Data-Driven Algorithm Design, Online Learning, and Private Optimizationcited by 37
  9. 2017Learning to Bid Without Knowing your Valuecited by 34
  10. 2020Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctionscited by 33
  11. 2020Learning to Bid Optimally and Efficiently in Adversarial First-price Auctionscited by 33
  12. 2018Contextual Bandits with Cross-learningcited by 31
12 more
  1. 2021Bilateral Trade: A Regret Minimization Perspectivecited by 29
  2. 2021Auctions Between Regret-Minimizing Agentscited by 22
  3. 2021A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Tradecited by 19
  4. 2021Learning to Bid in Contextual First Price Auctionscited by 19
  5. 2023Repeated Bilateral Trade Against a Smoothed Adversarycited by 15
  6. 2020Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctionscited by 14
  7. 2022Minimax Regret for Partial Monitoring: Infinite Outcomes and Rustichini's Regretcited by 13
  8. 2022Leveraging the Hints: Adaptive Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctionscited by 11
  9. 2016Correlated and Coarse equilibria of Single-item auctionscited by 8
  10. 2020A Nearest Neighbor Characterization of Lebesgue Points in Metric Measure Spacescited by 8
  11. 2021Nash Convergence of Mean-Based Learning Algorithms in First-Price Auctionscited by 8
  12. 2021Fast Rate Learning in Stochastic First Price Biddingcited by 7

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2023: 3; 2024: 4; 2025: 5; 2026: 3.

15 papers.

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  1. 2023No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balancecited by 17
  2. 2024Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctionscited by 7
  3. 2025Nearly Tight Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Tradecited by 7
  4. 2025Joint Value Estimation and Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctionscited by 6
  5. 2024Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspectivecited by 5
  6. 2025Learning to Bid in Non-Stationary Repeated First-Price Auctionscited by 5
  7. 2024A Parametric Contextual Online Learning Theory of Brokeragecited by 4
  8. 2024Market Making without Regretcited by 4
  9. 2023Learning Thresholds with Latent Values and Censored Feedbackcited by 3
  10. 2023Adaptive maximization of social welfarecited by 2
  11. 2025Improved learning rates in multi-unit uniform price auctionscited by 2
  12. 2026The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad: An Online Causal Framework for Repeated Second-price Auctionscited by 2
3 more
  1. 2025Comparing Uniform Price and Discriminatory Multi-Unit Auctions through Regret Minimizationcited by 1
  2. 2026Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversarycited by 1
  3. 2026Is Online Linear Optimization Sufficient for Strategic Robustness?cited by 0