Markovian Embeddings for Coalitional Bargaining Games
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Abstract (arXiv)
We examine the Markovian properties of coalition bargaining games, in particular, the case where past rejected proposals cannot be repeated. We propose a Markovian embedding with filtrations to render the sates Markovian and thus, fit into the framework of stochastic games.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 2 of its 10 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 19 Jun 2023.
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References · 2
- 2020Game-Theoretic Multiagent Reinforcement Learningcited by 94
- 2020Negotiating Team Formation Using Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 13
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