mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Characterizing Manipulation from AI Systems

arXiv 2303.09387 ↗First posted 16 Mar 2023cs.CYcited by 43

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Abstract (arXiv)

Manipulation is a common concern in many domains, such as social media, advertising, and chatbots. As AI systems mediate more of our interactions with the world, it is important to understand the degree to which AI systems might manipulate humans without the intent of the system designers. Our work clarifies challenges in defining and measuring manipulation in the context of AI systems. Firstly, we build upon prior literature on manipulation from other fields and characterize the space of possible notions of manipulation, which we find to depend upon the concepts of incentives, intent, harm, and covertness. We review proposals on how to operationalize each factor. Second, we propose a definition of manipulation based on our characterization: a system is manipulative if it acts as if it were pursuing an incentive to change a human (or another agent) intentionally and covertly. Third, we discuss the connections between manipulation and related concepts, such as deception and coercion. Finally, we contextualize our operationalization of manipulation in some applications. Our overall assessment is that while some progress has been made in defining and measuring manipulation from AI systems, many gaps remain. In the absence of a consensus definition and reliable tools for measurement, we cannot rule out the possibility that AI systems learn to manipulate humans without the intent of the system designers. We argue that such manipulation poses a significant threat to human autonomy, suggesting that precautionary actions to mitigate it are warranted.

Key facts. Cited by 43 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 16 Mar 2023.

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Citing papers per year: 2023: 10; 2024: 16; 2025: 10; 2026: 7.

43 papers.

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  1. 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 743
  2. 2023Large Language Model Alignment: A Surveycited by 241
  3. 2023AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutionscited by 185
  4. 2023Can LLM-Generated Misinformation Be Detected?cited by 173
  5. 2023How to Catch an AI Liar: Lie Detection in Black-Box LLMs by Asking Unrelated Questionscited by 82
  6. 2024Building Machines that Learn and Think with Peoplecited by 73
  7. 2024Feedback Loops With Language Models Drive In-Context Reward Hackingcited by 70
  8. 2024Beyond Preferences in AI Alignmentcited by 46
  9. 2024On Targeted Manipulation and Deception when Optimizing LLMs for User Feedbackcited by 45
  10. 2023Honesty Is the Best Policy: Defining and Mitigating AI Deceptioncited by 40
  11. 2024AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functionscited by 33
  12. 2023Discovering Variable Binding Circuitry with Desideratacited by 32
31 more
  1. 2024Adversaries Can Misuse Combinations of Safe Modelscited by 31
  2. 2024Persuasion with Large Language Models: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, Study Methodologies, and Ethical Implicationscited by 30
  3. 2024From Lived Experience to Insight: Unpacking the Psychological Risks of Using AI Conversational Agentscited by 25
  4. 2024Locking Down the Finetuned LLMs Safetycited by 22
  5. 2026Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thoughtcited by 22
  6. 2024Understanding the Learning Dynamics of Alignment with Human Feedbackcited by 15
  7. 2025Adversarial Poetry as a Universal Single-Turn Jailbreak Mechanism in Large Language Modelscited by 14
  8. 2025Inherent and emergent liability issues in LLM-based agentic systems: a principal-agent perspectivecited by 12
  9. 2025Build Agent Advocates, Not Platform Agentscited by 8
  10. 2025Distributional AGI Safetycited by 8
  11. 2024Can DPO Learn Diverse Human Values? A Theoretical Scaling Lawcited by 7
  12. 2024Sociotechnical Implications of Generative Artificial Intelligence for Information Accesscited by 6
  13. 2024Challenges and Future Directions of Data-Centric AI Alignmentcited by 5
  14. 2023On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagramscited by 4
  15. 2025Scheming Ability in LLM-to-LLM Strategic Interactionscited by 4
  16. 2024Dishonesty in Helpful and Harmless Alignmentcited by 3
  17. 2025How Well Can Preference Optimization Generalize Under Noisy Feedback?cited by 3
  18. 2025Clean First, Align Later: Benchmarking Preference Data Cleaning for Reliable LLM Alignmentcited by 2
  19. 2023Strengthening the EU AI Act: Defining Key Terms on AI Manipulationcited by 1
  20. 2023Agent-Specific Effects: A Causal Effect Propagation Analysis in Multi-Agent MDPscited by 1
  21. 2025Detecting Malicious AI Agents Through Simulated Interactionscited by 1
  22. 2026Bounded Minds, Generative Machines: Envisioning Conversational AI that Works with Human Heuristics and Reduces Bias Riskcited by 1
  23. 2024Characterising Interventions in Causal Gamescited by 0
  24. 2024Limits to Predicting Online Speech Using Large Language Modelscited by 0
  25. 2025When Assisting One Disempowers Anothercited by 0
  26. 2025Human-AI Interaction Alignment: Designing, Evaluating, and Evolving Value-Centered AI For Reciprocal Human-AI Futurescited by 0
  27. 2026Questionnaire Responses Do not Capture the Safety of AI Agentscited by 0
  28. 2026A Model of Multi-turn Human Persuadability Using Probabilistic Belief Tracingcited by 0
  29. 2026Persuasion Attacks Can Decrease Effectiveness of CoT Monitoringcited by 0
  30. 2026AISPA: User-Centric System Prompt Auditing for Large Language Model Applicationscited by 0
  31. 2026Toward Meaningful Transparency for AI Chatbots: Disclosing Persuasive Intent Reduces Persuasioncited by 0