mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Detecting Malicious AI Agents Through Simulated Interactions

arXiv 2504.03726 ↗First posted 31 Mar 2025cs.CR cs.AI cs.LGcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

This study investigates malicious AI Assistants' manipulative traits and whether the behaviours of malicious AI Assistants can be detected when interacting with human-like simulated users in various decision-making contexts. We also examine how interaction depth and ability of planning influence malicious AI Assistants' manipulative strategies and effectiveness. Using a controlled experimental design, we simulate interactions between AI Assistants (both benign and deliberately malicious) and users across eight decision-making scenarios of varying complexity and stakes. Our methodology employs two state-of-the-art language models to generate interaction data and implements Intent-Aware Prompting (IAP) to detect malicious AI Assistants. The findings reveal that malicious AI Assistants employ domain-specific persona-tailored manipulation strategies, exploiting simulated users' vulnerabilities and emotional triggers. In particular, simulated users demonstrate resistance to manipulation initially, but become increasingly vulnerable to malicious AI Assistants as the depth of the interaction increases, highlighting the significant risks associated with extended engagement with potentially manipulative systems. IAP detection methods achieve high precision with zero false positives but struggle to detect many malicious AI Assistants, resulting in high false negative rates. These findings underscore critical risks in human-AI interactions and highlight the need for robust, context-sensitive safeguards against manipulative AI behaviour in increasingly autonomous decision-support systems.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 31 Mar 2025.

Builds on

8 of 29 references.

References · 8

  1. 2018Personalizing Dialogue Agents: I have a dog, do you have pets too?cited by 828
  2. 2024LLM Agents Grounded in Self-Reports Enable General-Purpose Simulation of Individualscited by 249
  3. 2023AI Deception: A Survey of Examples, Risks, and Potential Solutionscited by 188
  4. 2024Visibility into AI Agentscited by 79
  5. 2023Characterizing Manipulation from AI Systemscited by 43
  6. 2023Power-seeking can be probable and predictive for trained agentscited by 25
  7. 2024Detecting Conversational Mental Manipulation with Intent-Aware Promptingcited by 16
  8. 2024Deception and Manipulation in Generative AIcited by 8

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Detection of adversarial intent in Human-AI teams using LLMs
  2. 2026Towards Modeling Cybersecurity Behavior of Humans in Organizations ↗
  3. 2026HRGuard: Gating Relationship Manipulation in Multi-Turn Agentic AI Conversations
  4. 2026Coding with "Enemy": Can Human Developers Detect AI Agent Sabotage?
  5. 2025PersonaTeaming: Exploring How Introducing Personas Can Improve Automated AI Red-Teaming
  6. 2025OpenDeception: Learning Deception and Trust in Human-AI Interaction via Multi-Agent Simulation
  7. 2025OpenAgentSafety: A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating Real-World AI Agent Safety
  8. 2026SkillSecurer: Detecting and Patching Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in AI Agent Skills