mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design

arXiv 2202.05947 ↗First posted 12 Feb 2022econ.TH cs.AI cs.GTcited by 20

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Abstract (arXiv)

Motivated by online advertising auctions, we study auction design in repeated auctions played by simple Artificial Intelligence algorithms (Q-learning). We find that first-price auctions with no additional feedback lead to tacit-collusive outcomes (bids lower than values), while second-price auctions do not. We show that the difference is driven by the incentive in first-price auctions to outbid opponents by just one bid increment. This facilitates re-coordination on low bids after a phase of experimentation. We also show that providing information about lowest bid to win, as introduced by Google at the time of switch to first-price auctions, increases competitiveness of auctions.

Key facts. Cited by 20 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 3 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Feb 2022.

Builds on

3 of 34 references.

References · 3

  1. 2019Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: A Selective Overview of Theories and Algorithmscited by 555
  2. 2021Auctions Between Regret-Minimizing Agentscited by 22
  3. 2019Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctionscited by 7

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2023: 6; 2024: 5; 2025: 6; 2026: 3.

20 papers.

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  1. 2024Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Modelscited by 54
  2. 2024Strategic Collusion of LLM Agents: Market Division in Multi-Commodity Competitionscited by 25
  3. 2025An Economy of AI Agentscited by 17
  4. 2025EconEvals: Benchmarks and Litmus Tests for Economic Decision-Making by LLM Agentscited by 8
  5. 2023Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devicescited by 7
  6. 2025Learning to Bid in Non-Stationary Repeated First-Price Auctionscited by 5
  7. 2025Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experimentcited by 3
  8. 2024Understanding Iterative Combinatorial Auction Designs via Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learningcited by 2
  9. 2023Cheap Talking Algorithmscited by 1
  10. 2024Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agentscited by 1
  11. 2026Solipsistic Superintelligence is Unlikely to be Cooperativecited by 1
  12. 2026Mitigating Retaliatory Algorithmic Collusion in Repeated Gamescited by 1
8 more
  1. 2023Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contractcited by 0
  2. 2023Learned Collusioncited by 0
  3. 2023Advancing Ad Auction Realism: Practical Insights & Modeling Implicationscited by 0
  4. 2023Algorithmic Collusion or Competition: the Role of Platforms' Recommender Systemscited by 0
  5. 2024Artificial Intelligence for Multi-Unit Auction designcited by 0
  6. 2025Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctionscited by 0
  7. 2025Tacit Bidder-Side Collusion: Artificial Intelligence in Dynamic Auctionscited by 0
  8. 2026Persistent Partners Raise Prices Among Learning Agentscited by 0