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Models of Computational Profiles to Study the Likelihood of DNN Metamorphic Test Cases

arXiv 2107.13491 ↗First posted 28 Jul 2021cs.LG cs.SEcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Neural network test cases are meant to exercise different reasoning paths in an architecture and used to validate the prediction outcomes. In this paper, we introduce "computational profiles" as vectors of neuron activation levels. We investigate the distribution of computational profile likelihood of metamorphic test cases with respect to the likelihood distributions of training, test and error control cases. We estimate the non-parametric probability densities of neuron activation levels for each distinct output class. Probabilities are inferred using training cases only, without any additional knowledge about metamorphic test cases. Experiments are performed by training a network on the MNIST Fashion library of images and comparing prediction likelihoods with those obtained from error control-data and from metamorphic test cases. Experimental results show that the distributions of computational profile likelihood for training and test cases are somehow similar, while the distribution of the random-noise control-data is always remarkably lower than the observed one for the training and testing sets. In contrast, metamorphic test cases show a prediction likelihood that lies in an extended range with respect to training, tests, and random noise. Moreover, the presented approach allows the independent assessment of different training classes and experiments to show that some of the classes are more sensitive to misclassifying metamorphic test cases than other classes. In conclusion, metamorphic test cases represent very aggressive tests for neural network architectures. Furthermore, since metamorphic test cases force a network to misclassify those inputs whose likelihood is similar to that of training cases, they could also be considered as adversarial attacks that evade defenses based on computational profile likelihood evaluation.

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References · 20

  1. 2017Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defensescited by 833
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  12. 2017Exploring the Landscape of Spatial Robustnesscited by 81
8 more
  1. 2016Adversarial Examples Detection in Deep Networks with Convolutional Filter Statisticscited by 77
  2. 2020Fundamental Tradeoffs between Invariance and Sensitivity to Adversarial Perturbationscited by 55
  3. 2017Adversarial and Clean Data Are Not Twinscited by 52
  4. 2018Adversarial Sample Detection for Deep Neural Network through Model Mutation Testingcited by 48
  5. 2019Robustness of Neural Networks: A Probabilistic and Practical Approachcited by 38
  6. 2016Early Methods for Detecting Adversarial Imagescited by 36
  7. 2019DeepEvolution: A Search-Based Testing Approach for Deep Neural Networkscited by 15
  8. 2020RAID: Randomized Adversarial-Input Detection for Neural Networkscited by 8

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