Phragm'en's Voting Methods and Justified Representation
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Abstract (arXiv)
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragm'en proposed a load-balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three committee voting rules resulting from this approach: two optimization variants - one minimizing the maximal load and one minimizing the variance of loads - and a sequential variant. We study Phragm'en's methods from an axiomatic point of view, focusing on properties capturing proportional representation. We show that the sequential variant satisfies proportional justified representation, which is a rare property for committee monotonic methods. Moreover, we show that the optimization variants satisfy perfect representation. We also analyze the computational complexity of Phragm'en's methods and provide mixed-integer programming based algorithms for computing them.
Key facts. Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 24 Feb 2021.
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Citing papers per year: 2023: 3; 2024: 2; 2025: 3; 2026: 4.
12 papers.
- 2023Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Makingcited by 17
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Votingcited by 14
- 2024Generative AI voting: fair collective choice is resilient to LLM biases and inconsistenciescited by 6
- 2025Full Proportional Justified Representationcited by 3
- 2024Harm Ratio: A Novel and Versatile Fairness Criterioncited by 1
- 2025Proportional Committee Elections with Positive and Negative Votescited by 1
- 2025Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst for Democratic Resilience: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguardingcited by 1
- 2026Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizationscited by 1
- 2026Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computationcited by 1
- 2023Data as Voters: Core Set Selection Using Approval-Based Multi-Winner Votingcited by 0
- 2026A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilitiescited by 0
- 2026From Validator Selection to Portfolio Collection Optimization in Proof-of-Stake Blockchainscited by 0
- 2026Strengthening Full Justified Representation: Efficient Verification and Computation11 Aug 2026
- 2026From Validator Selection to Portfolio Collection Optimization in Proof-of-Stake Blockchains6 Jun 2026
- 2026Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations4 May 2026
- 2026A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities9 Feb 2026
- 2025Fair Voting Methods as a Catalyst for Democratic Resilience: A Trilogy on Legitimacy, Impact and AI Safeguarding19 Dec 2025
- 2025Proportional Committee Elections with Positive and Negative Votes3 Mar 2025
- 2025Full Proportional Justified Representation21 Jan 2025
- 2024Harm Ratio: A Novel and Versatile Fairness Criterion3 Oct 2024
- 2024Generative AI voting: fair collective choice is resilient to LLM biases and inconsistencies31 May 2024
- 2023Temporal Fairness in Multiwinner Voting7 Dec 2023
- 2023Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making26 Jun 2023
- 2023Data as Voters: Core Set Selection Using Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting19 Apr 2023