A Generalized Minimax Q-learning Algorithm for Two-Player Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
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Abstract (arXiv)
We consider the problem of two-player zero-sum games. This problem is formulated as a min-max Markov game in the literature. The solution of this game, which is the min-max payoff, starting from a given state is called the min-max value of the state. In this work, we compute the solution of the two-player zero-sum game utilizing the technique of successive relaxation that has been successfully applied in the literature to compute a faster value iteration algorithm in the context of Markov Decision Processes. We extend the concept of successive relaxation to the setting of two-player zero-sum games. We show that, under a special structure on the game, this technique facilitates faster computation of the min-max value of the states. We then derive a generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm that computes the optimal policy when the model information is not known. Finally, we prove the convergence of the proposed generalized minimax Q-learning algorithm utilizing stochastic approximation techniques, under an assumption on the boundedness of iterates. Through experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 16 Jun 2019.
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Citing papers per year: 2022: 1; 2023: 1; 2024: 3; 2025: 2; 2026: 1.
8 papers.
- 2023Finite-Time Analysis of Minimax Q-Learning for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games: Switching System Approachcited by 3
- 2024Two-Step Q-Learningcited by 1
- 2022Smoothing Policy Iteration for Zero-sum Markov Gamescited by 0
- 2024A Multi-Step Minimax Q-learning Algorithm for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Gamescited by 0
- 2024Double Successive Over-Relaxation Q-Learning with an Extension to Deep Reinforcement Learningcited by 0
- 2025Deep SOR Minimax Q-learning for Two-player Zero-sum Gamecited by 0
- 2025NDRL: Cotton Irrigation and Nitrogen Application with Nested Dual-Agent Reinforcement Learningcited by 0
- 2026Dynamical low-rank equilibrium computation for stochastic games between advanced persistent threats and moving target defensecited by 0
- 2026Dynamical low-rank equilibrium computation for stochastic games between advanced persistent threats and moving target defense20 Sep 2026
- 2025NDRL: Cotton Irrigation and Nitrogen Application with Nested Dual-Agent Reinforcement Learning18 Dec 2025
- 2025Deep SOR Minimax Q-learning for Two-player Zero-sum Game20 Nov 2025
- 2024Double Successive Over-Relaxation Q-Learning with an Extension to Deep Reinforcement Learning10 Sep 2024
- 2024A Multi-Step Minimax Q-learning Algorithm for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games5 Jul 2024
- 2024Two-Step Q-Learning2 Jul 2024
- 2023Finite-Time Analysis of Minimax Q-Learning for Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games: Switching System Approach9 Jun 2023
- 2022Smoothing Policy Iteration for Zero-sum Markov Games3 Dec 2022