mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Dynamic Pricing with Finitely Many Unknown Valuations

arXiv 1807.03288 ↗First posted 9 Jul 2018cs.LG stat.MLcited by 23

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Abstract (arXiv)

Motivated by posted price auctions where buyers are grouped in an unknown number of latent types characterized by their private values for the good on sale, we investigate revenue maximization in stochastic dynamic pricing when the distribution of buyers' private values is supported on an unknown set of points in [0,1] of unknown cardinality K. This setting can be viewed as an instance of a stochastic K-armed bandit problem where the location of the arms (the K unknown valuations) must be learned as well. In the distribution-free case, we prove that our setting is just as hard as K-armed stochastic bandits: no algorithm can achieve a regret significantly better than √KT, (where T is the time horizon); we present an efficient algorithm matching this lower bound up to logarithmic factors. In the distribution-dependent case, we show that for all K>2 our setting is strictly harder than K-armed stochastic bandits by proving that it is impossible to obtain regret bounds that grow logarithmically in time or slower. On the other hand, when a lower bound γ>0 on the smallest drop in the demand curve is known, we prove an upper bound on the regret of order (1/Delta+(log log T)/γ2)(Klog T). This is a significant improvement on previously known regret bounds for discontinuous demand curves, that are at best of order (K12/γ8)√T. When K=2 in the distribution-dependent case, the hardness of our setting reduces to that of a stochastic 2-armed bandit: we prove that an upper bound of order (log T)/Delta (up to loglog factors) on the regret can be achieved with no information on the demand curve. Finally, we show a O(√T) upper bound on the regret for the setting in which the buyers' decisions are nonstochastic, and the regret is measured with respect to the best between two fixed valuations one of which is known to the seller.

Key facts. Cited by 23 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 9 Jul 2018.

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Citing papers per year: 2021: 7; 2022: 3; 2023: 2; 2024: 4; 2025: 4; 2026: 3.

23 papers.

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  1. 2021Bilateral Trade: A Regret Minimization Perspectivecited by 29
  2. 2021Policy Optimization Using Semi-parametric Models for Dynamic Pricingcited by 23
  3. 2021Distribution-free Contextual Dynamic Pricingcited by 22
  4. 2021A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Tradecited by 19
  5. 2024Improved Algorithms for Contextual Dynamic Pricingcited by 11
  6. 2021Fast Rate Learning in Stochastic First Price Biddingcited by 7
  7. 2021Learning to Price Against a Moving Targetcited by 5
  8. 2023Bandit Sequential Posted Pricing via Half-Concavitycited by 5
  9. 2024Market Making without Regretcited by 4
  10. 2022Active Labeling: Streaming Stochastic Gradientscited by 3
  11. 2025Dynamic Pricing in the Linear Valuation Model using Shape Constraintscited by 3
  12. 2025Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyondcited by 3
11 more
  1. 2024Minimax Optimality in Contextual Dynamic Pricing with General Valuation Modelscited by 2
  2. 2023Smoothness-Adaptive Dynamic Pricing with Nonparametric Demand Learningcited by 1
  3. 2024Mode Estimation with Partial Feedbackcited by 1
  4. 2026Optimal Contextual Pricing under Agnostic Non-Lipschitz Demandcited by 1
  5. 2021Making the most of your day: online learning for optimal allocation of timecited by 0
  6. 2022An Application of Online Learning to Spacecraft Memory Dump Optimizationcited by 0
  7. 2022From Weakly Supervised Learning to Active Learningcited by 0
  8. 2025Parameter-Adaptive Dynamic Pricingcited by 0
  9. 2025Contextual Dynamic Pricing with Heterogeneous Buyerscited by 0
  10. 2026Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctionscited by 0
  11. 2026Learning to Price and Stock Under Contextual and Censored Demandcited by 0