Formalizing Preference Utilitarianism in Physical World Models
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Abstract (arXiv)
Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics and ultimately the question of how to "make the world better" with a formal basis.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 21 Apr 2015.
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Citing papers per year: 2024: 2.
2 papers.
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