Incoherent by Design? On the Moral Self-Consistency of LLMs
On the map: LLM reasoning → Reasoning benchmarks and evaluation
Abstract (arXiv)
LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations. A model that can state a moral principle may still violate it when the same scenario is rephrased or reframed. This inconsistency is a problem for any system whose outputs are used to inform moral decisions. If generative systems exhibit internal inconsistency, then the epistemic integrity of AI-mediated systems becomes uncertain. To study this concern, we investigate the stability of moral reasoning in LLMs within a controlled prompting framework across three major philosophical schools of thought: deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. We construct sets of morally equivalent scenarios in which the underlying situation is held constant while the framing varies to reflect different ethical stances and stylistic perturbations. We then evaluate responses from multiple models, including GPT, Mistral, and Llama. To assess consistency, we convert model outputs into structured logical statements and identify contradictions across responses generated within the same school of thought. Our results reveal substantial inconsistency with contradiction rates reaching up to 78% across scenarios. These findings point to a broader phenomenon of epistemic instability in generative AI wherein models fail to reliably maintain coherence with respect to their own prior outputs. This kind of instability carries real consequences. As generative systems influence how people form beliefs, judge actions, and absorb values, their inconsistencies can shape human reasoning and decision-making as well. Moreover, if a system cannot consistently represent its own normative commitments, then value alignment becomes a moving target rather than a well-defined objective. Thus, we argue that demonstrating internal incoherence is a necessary precursor to AI alignment.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Reasoning benchmarks and evaluation, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning. Builds on 5 of its 44 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Aug 2026.
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References · 5
- 2021On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Modelscited by 4,033
- 2022Beyond the Imitation Game: Quantifying and extrapolating the capabilities of language modelscited by 1,998
- 2021Ethical and social risks of harm from Language Modelscited by 966
- 2023AI Alignment: A Comprehensive Surveycited by 263
- 2024Measuring Moral Inconsistencies in Large Language Modelscited by 3
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