mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Separating Prompt Harmfulness from Interaction Safety via Partial Generation

arXiv 2610.16761 ↗First posted 12 Oct 2026cs.AI cs.IR cs.LGcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails

Abstract (arXiv)

LLM-based information systems need safety guardrails. Most guardrails classify the prompt alone. If the prompt looks harmful, the system rejects it before any answer is generated. This is costly. Many rejected prompts would have received a safe response. Users lose help they should have received from the information system. This cost grows as conversational and generative search becomes common. Prompt-level labels treat harm as a property of the query. But harm depends on what the model actually writes. Existing input-output guards do look at responses. But they judge a finished response, so the decision comes after full generation. However, we observe that safety of model interaction with the input prompt can be inferred early with only partial output. So the system can start generating, watch the partial response, and stop only if it turns harmful. We test this idea in three steps. First, we build a dataset of 41,944 prompt-response pairs with seven open weights LLMs from three families: Llama, Gemma, and Qwen. Second, we show that prompt harmfulness and interaction safety differ. Prompt labels and response labels agree on only 50.46% of items (Cohen's kappa = 0.06). Of the prompts that make any model respond harmfully, only 3.5% do so for all seven LLMs. Third, we show that partial responses carry most of the signal. Fine-tuned classifiers predict response-level harm well (best AUPRC 0.885, F1 0.807). About one third of the response tokens recover almost full-response AUPRC.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 18 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Oct 2026.

Builds on

18 of 23 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Mitigating LLM Over-Refusal via Dynamic Semantic Routing Calibration6 Sep
  2. 2025Qwen3Guard Technical Report16 Oct
  3. 2025CARE: Decoding Time Safety Alignment via Rollback and Introspection Intervention1 Sep
  4. 2025From Judgment to Interference: Early Stopping LLM Harmful Outputs via Streaming Content Monitoring11 Jun
  5. 2025No Free Lunch with Guardrails1 Apr
  6. 2024WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMs26 Jun
  7. 2024OR-Bench: An Over-Refusal Benchmark for Large Language Models31 May

Other references · 11

  1. 2023QLoRA: Efficient Finetuning of Quantized LLMscited by 3,418
  2. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 3,104
  3. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
  4. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  5. 2024Chatbot Arena: An Open Platform for Evaluating LLMs by Human Preferencecited by 1,184
  6. 2023BeaverTails: Towards Improved Safety Alignment of LLM via a Human-Preference Datasetcited by 860
  7. 2023XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Modelscited by 505
  8. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
  9. 2024ShieldGemma: Generative AI Content Moderation Based on Gemmacited by 243
  10. 2024SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusalcited by 240
  11. 2025Unsafe LLM-Based Search: Quantitative Analysis and Mitigation of Safety Risks in AI Web Searchcited by 16

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Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2024On Prompt-Driven Safeguarding for Large Language Models
  2. 2024Mitigating Exaggerated Safety in Large Language Models
  3. 2026RAG-Safety-Bench: Reliable Evaluation of Retrieval-Augmented LLM Safety
  4. 2024Safe to Serve: Aligning Instruction-Tuned Models for Safety and Helpfulness
  5. 2025Let Them Down Easy! Contextual Effects of LLM Guardrails on User Perceptions and Preferences
  6. 2026Mind the GAP: Text Safety Does Not Transfer to Tool-Call Safety in LLM Agents
  7. 2025SafeSwitch: Steering Unsafe LLM Behavior via Internal Activation Signals
  8. 2026Safety Paradox: How Enhanced Safety Awareness Leaves LLMs Vulnerable to Posterior Attack