TRAP: Tool-result Replay Attack for Probing Misbinding in LLM Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance also fits: Software engineering coding agents
Abstract (arXiv)
As AI agents increasingly act through external tools, tool results are no longer simple outputs but execution artifacts that must remain correctly associated with the context that produced them. Yet as results persist across caches, recovery mechanisms, and shared runtime state, this association can break, causing a real and unmodified result to be consumed in an incompatible execution context and lead the agent to an unsafe action. We characterize this failure as tool-result misbinding. To systematically study this failure, we introduce ReplayBench, a benchmark that uses controlled tool-result replay to evaluate misbinding across 19 representative agent scenarios, 4 failure properties, and 3 replay mechanisms. Across eight LLMs, three agent frameworks, and diverse stateful workflows, we find widespread replay-induced failures, with a mean Final-State Error Rate of 0.649 under cross-task replay. Stage-wise analysis localizes these failures to model-side action generation. Further analyses show that replay susceptibility varies with task similarity, shows little dependence on object similarity, and remains high under result staleness and implicit environment changes. These findings motivate runtime validity mechanisms that eliminate final-state errors in our evaluated settings while preserving legitimate recovery. The results call for explicit contextual binding in tool-using agent runtimes. Our work is public at https://github.com/Phitooo/Replaybench.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 12 of its 29 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Oct 2026.
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12 of 29 references.
Closest ancestors · 9
Same direction, newest first
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- 2025MCP-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models with Real-World MCP Servers17 Dec
- 2025Breaking Agent Backbones: Evaluating the Security of Backbone LLMs in AI Agents26 Oct
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox25 Sep
Other references · 3
- 2025MCIP: Protecting MCP Safety via Model Contextual Integrity Protocolcited by 34
- 2026AsyncTool: Evaluating the Asynchronous Function Calling Capability under Multi-Task Scenarioscited by 5
- 2026CORPGEN: Simulating Corporate Environments with Autonomous Digital Employees in Multi-Horizon Task Environmentscited by 1
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