DRYLAB-Bench: Benchmarking the Biosecurity Risk of Agentic LLM Mutation Design
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance also fits: Medical and scientific domain agents
Abstract (arXiv)
As large language models (LLMs) acquire advanced biological design capabilities, they offer substantial research benefits but simultaneously introduce severe dual-use risks, such as engineering enhanced pathogens or drug-resistant bacteria. While biosecurity frameworks recognize these threats, the actual risk of LLMs executing dangerous biological modifications remains unquantified, particularly when augmented with specialized biological design tools (BDTs). Existing evaluations primarily assess hazardous knowledge possession rather than practical application, overlook risk amplification from BDTs, and rely on unreliable, expensive, or hazardous validation methods. To address these gaps, we introduce DRYLAB-Bench (Design Risk Yielded by LLM Agent in Biodesign), the first comprehensive benchmark evaluating the high-risk biological mutation design capabilities of LLM agents. Moving beyond basic question-answering, DRYLAB-Bench tasks agents with 30 genuinely hazardous mutation-design scenarios distilled from biosecurity guidelines. It evaluates models in a multi-round, tool-augmented environment where LLMs orchestrate BDTs to iteratively refine candidates. Crucially, it scores designs directly against 187,695 empirical wet-lab measurements from ProteinGym and ViroGym using our proposed Biosecurity Risk Score (BRS), quantifying risk-associated effects while enabling scalable and safe ground-truth verification. Evaluations of 15 frontier models reveal substantial baseline threats: without tools, 67.6% of one-shot designs exceed the average measured variant, and 21.4% reach the highest-risk decile. Equipping models with BDTs significantly amplifies this risk, raising the pooled risk by (Delta BRS=+0.116) and the top-decile share to 23.5%. Code: https://github.com/drylab-bio/DRYLAB-Bench
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 7 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Oct 2026.
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References · 7
- 2025BixBench: a Comprehensive Benchmark for LLM-based Agents in Computational Biologycited by 89
- 2025Virology Capabilities Test (VCT): A Multimodal Virology Q&A Benchmarkcited by 31
- 2026ABC-Bench: An Agentic Bio-Capabilities Benchmark for Biosecuritycited by 6
- 2025Open-weight genome language model safeguards: Assessing robustness via adversarial fine-tuningcited by 5
- 2026ViroGym: Realistic Large-Scale Benchmarks for Evaluating Viral Proteinscited by 2
- 2026BioTIER: A Refusal Benchmark for Targeted Biological Risk Mitigationcited by 2
- 2026Agentic BAIM-LLM Evaluation (ABLE): Benchmarking LLM Use of Protein Design Toolscited by 1
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- 2025SoSBench: Benchmarking Safety Alignment on Six Scientific Domains
- 2026MolDesignBench: Evaluating LLM-based Agent for Scenario-grounded Molecular Design
- 2026BioSecBench-Refusal: A paired metric for performance and alignment in agentic biosecurity risk assessment
- 2026Toward Reliable, Safe, and Secure LLMs for Scientific Applications
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents
- 2025Biosecurity-Aware AI: Agentic Risk Auditing of Soft Prompt Attacks on ESM-Based Variant Predictors