Target-free Latent Safety Alignment
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) remain highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that induce harmful behaviors and circumvent safety alignment. To defend against such attacks, adversarial training paradigms have been proposed to first simulate failure modes and then train the model to correct them, yielding promising improvements in safety alignment. However, these methods typically construct adversarial samples either by encouraging fixed harmful target completions or by performing targeted activation ablation derived from fixed benign--harmful data pairs. As a result, the generated adversarial samples tend to induce homogeneous harmful behaviors that poorly reflect the diversity of behaviors elicited by real-world jailbreak attacks. This behavior-level narrowness fundamentally limits their robustness. To address this issue, we propose a target-free adversarial training framework that generates adversarial samples in an unsupervised manner. By amplifying and diversifying behavior-level shifts in the model's latent space, our approach produces semantically diverse adversarial samples that induce a wide range of harmful behaviors. This expanded behavioral coverage exposes more diverse failure modes and thereby improves safety alignment. To quantify this effect, we use semantic entropy as an output-level measure of adversarial behavioral diversity. Empirically, our method elicits diverse harmful behaviors in the target model, substantially mitigating behavioral narrowness and improving robustness to jailbreak attacks.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. First posted on arXiv 3 Oct 2026.
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