Constitutional adapters: Inference-time interventions for misalignment and misuse
On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security also fits: Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails
Abstract (arXiv)
Training models to act in accordance with an explicitly defined set of principles, or "constitution," has shown promise as a robust and transparent mechanism for AI alignment. However, the generality and flexibility of such methods remain unclear. Here, we show that constitution-consistent behavior can be distilled from synthetic corpora into lightweight objects (low-rank adapters and steering vectors). Despite never seeing a harmful request or jailbreak during training, such objects increase jailbreak defense success and measured alignment -- particularly at long context lengths and against multi-turn attacks, where they outperform both prompted and steered baselines. Subtracting control-trained from constitution-trained objects further accentuates these effects, yielding defenses we call "constitutional adapters" (CAs). CAs can be trained on a base model, transferred zero-shot to its post-trained checkpoint, and scaled at inference time to predictably trade off defense for benign compliance. Taken together, these results recommend CAs as a lightweight, portable, and tunable lever for mitigating misalignment and misuse in API deployments.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 66 of its 77 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Sep 2026.
Builds on
66 of 77 references.
Closest ancestors · 2
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Building Production-Ready Probes For Gemini16 Jan
- 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal6 Feb
Other references · 64
- 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,084
- 2021Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problemscited by 9,743
- 2020Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understandingcited by 7,768
- 2019Parameter-Efficient Transfer Learning for NLPcited by 4,195
- 2021Prefix-Tuning: Optimizing Continuous Prompts for Generationcited by 3,878
- 2021The Power of Scale for Parameter-Efficient Prompt Tuningcited by 3,769
- 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
- 2023Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queriescited by 1,326
- 2023Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Modelcited by 1,259
- 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,239
- 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
38 more
- 2022Editing Models with Task Arithmeticcited by 1,076
- 2023Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Additioncited by 1,009
- 2024Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Directioncited by 960
- 2021Ethical and social risks of harm from Language Modelscited by 957
- 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 824
- 2024BigCodeBench: Benchmarking Code Generation with Diverse Function Calls and Complex Instructionscited by 527
- 2024JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Modelscited by 494
- 2023XSTest: A Test Suite for Identifying Exaggerated Safety Behaviours in Large Language Modelscited by 477
- 2024Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deepcited by 450
- 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 434
- 2024Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attackcited by 364
- 2024A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreakscited by 352
- 2025Persona Vectors: Monitoring and Controlling Character Traits in Language Modelscited by 303
- 2024Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakerscited by 302
- 2024Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Modelscited by 292
- 2022The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspectivecited by 246
- 2023A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easilycited by 242
- 2024OR-Bench: An Over-Refusal Benchmark for Large Language Modelscited by 222
- 2022Extracting Latent Steering Vectors from Pretrained Language Modelscited by 217
- 2024WildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Modelscited by 206
- 2025AxBench: Steering LLMs? Even Simple Baselines Outperform Sparse Autoencoderscited by 199
- 2024Programming Refusal with Conditional Activation Steeringcited by 191
- 2024ReFT: Representation Finetuning for Language Modelscited by 186
- 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 172
- 2024Latent Adversarial Training Improves Robustness to Persistent Harmful Behaviors in LLMscited by 158
- 2023Composing Parameter-Efficient Modules with Arithmetic Operationscited by 155
- 2024LLM Defenses Are Not Robust to Multi-Turn Human Jailbreaks Yetcited by 145
- 2025Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threatscited by 136
- 2024Analyzing the Generalization and Reliability of Steering Vectorscited by 130
- 2024Safe LoRA: the Silver Lining of Reducing Safety Risks when Fine-tuning Large Language Modelscited by 122
- 2024Personalized Steering of Large Language Models: Versatile Steering Vectors Through Bi-directional Preference Optimizationcited by 112
- 2024Language Models are Homer Simpson! Safety Re-Alignment of Fine-tuned Language Models through Task Arithmeticcited by 105
- 2025Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluatedcited by 105
- 2024LLMs know their vulnerabilities: Uncover Safety Gaps through Natural Distribution Shiftscited by 80
- 2024Does Refusal Training in LLMs Generalize to the Past Tense?cited by 74
- 2024Best-of-N Jailbreakingcited by 71
- 2024CodeAttack: Revealing Safety Generalization Challenges of Large Language Models via Code Completioncited by 70
- 2024Measuring and Controlling Instruction (In)Stability in Language Model Dialogscited by 51
50 most cited of 64 All 64 (JSON)
Built on by
Not cited yet.